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Roger Pearson
General Editor
Dwight D. Murphey
Associate Editor

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Upgrading U.S. National Security for the 21st Century

Robert C. Richardson III
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The Situation and the Problem – Circa 1996

We now need a whole new look at the size, shape and nature of the U.S. defense establishment. Commonsense indicates that neither the United States' national security policies and concepts nor defense organization are today even remotely suitable for providing the U.S. with the most cost-effective posture and best military capabilities to start the 21st century.

Major changes are called for not only by the demise of the Cold War, but also by past failures fully to adopt and exploit technological progress. In addition, some of the new capabilities and defense environments resulting from this progress have brought into question the continued validity of even classic principles and traditional military concepts.

Nothing short of major, fundamental changes will produce an optimum U.S. defense establishment in terms of cost and effectiveness. Because of this and the inherent resistance to major changes by the vested interests in all large organizations, only an independent "New Look," or "New Approach," study has any prospect of defining the changes needed and of pointing out how to bring these about.

The first step in such a study must be to identify the most important fundamental changes and the reasons they can no longer be ignored. Specifically, they are the changes that cannot be brought about by evolutionary, or minor so-called "body English," adjustments to existing policies or posture.

While many studies and writings have recognized the need for a major review of U.S. security requirements, most of those currently circulating have focused on specific areas -- individual trees – in the defense jungle. Largely ignoring the basic adjustments that are required first, they in effect represent attempts to build a new structure on obsolete real estate.

The purpose of this article is to identify some of these "first tier" conceptual, policy and structural changes that are prerequisites to any effort to define a valid, cost-effective U.S. defense establishment for

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the next half-century.

A New Look has also been made necessary by increasing Congressional resistance to spending on defense due to the national debt problem. Moreover, there is the fact that the U.S. defense establishment has as yet not been fully updated in keeping with either the findings of the Gulf War or the possibilities generated by the technological progress over the past twenty to thirty years. We have yet to exploit the potential of space systems that are now realizable and could readily be deployed.

In many areas, U.S. defense policies, force structures and service doctrines have long been out of step with technological progress. Technology has brought us real-time communications, access to space, dramatic improvements in weaponry, and many other innovations whose potential role in national security, let alone in cost reduction, has not been fully understood or accepted.

Basic problems that will have to be reviewed include: whether separate land, sea and air services continue to make sense; where space fits into any new organization; whether long wars of attrition and national mobilization bases are a thing of the past; and whether it any longer makes sense to measure relative military strength in numbers of men and weapons – divisions, planes or ships. Issues such as the validity of three services or even of land, sea and air in substantively different combat environments, along with some fundamental and historic principles such as the relationship of military "mass" to the ability to destroy or conquer, need to be re-examined. Much of Clausewitz, Mahan and Douhet has become obsolete by virtue of technological progress and geopolitical change.

One way to approach this problem is to start with a clean slate. We can imagine that we are designing a national security establishment for a new nation. This means no existing organizations, concepts, policies, doctrines, traditions, or even weapon systems need be retained unless they make sense. There is too much interlocking between all defense functions and activities to assume revolutionary changes can be made in one or more parts while automatically retaining others.

Obviously there are limits to the changes that can be accommodated in any given time. It is certain that most major ones will be resisted. They have been in the past or we would not be in the mess we are in now. Nevertheless, this problem, like the federal deficit,

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has to be faced. Logically enough, the right answers tend to be simple, explainable and understandable – and hence salable to the voters. This alone should facilitate accomplishing the logical changes.

Some Fundamental Changes That Are Needed

As a framework for the analysis, let us start with what I call "the basic defense equation". This is a simple equation that is all too often ignored by planners and politicians even though it it is key to optimizing the military capabilities required to cope with any threat, large or small. Simply stated, it postulates that: JOB + METHOD + MEANS must be equal to or greater than the THREAT one has to deal with.

This means that whatever task the military has to do (such as "defend the Rhine, seize control of the air or the seas, or protect the U.S. against missiles"), PLUS how one decides to go about dealing with it ("the strategies, doctrines, tactics, to be used), PLUS the means one has or can obtain ("the forces, weapons, or money to buy these with") should equal or exceed the sum of the same factors on the threat side as measured by their combined capabilities. In brief: JOB + METHOD + MEANS => THREAT. While this equation may seem obvious, please bear with me. It is critical to commonsense force level and hence cost decisions because it obliges consideration of all the variables. Keeping this equation in mind requires defense planners to recognize that any THREAT (a factor we don't control) can be met by changing one or more variables that we do control. The Job or Task and the Methods we adopt to do these are potential variables, as are the Means available.

Most defense establishments, and especially their military, try to respond to any change in threats by adjusting up or down the forces, weapons, and funds available to them. This is what we have been witnessing recently between Congress and the administration over Department of Defense budget cuts and Bosnia. When a new or greater threat arises, the military almost always asks for more money or more troops and/or additional weapon systems. When the threat declines, the politicians cut the military forces and/or budgets. Very rarely will either propose to cope with the change in threat by merely changing strategy, tactics or doctrine (how they plan to deal with it), even though new technologies permit this. Nor do they often consider accepting somewhat greater risk in their ability to do the old jobs in

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different ways. The reluctance exists notwithstanding the fact that both of these are often valid options.

Two simple real-world examples will help us understand the importance of this equation to defense plans and requirements and the role this can play in controlling defense spending.

The NATO Example

In the early 1950s the NATO countries, collectively, could not afford to match the Warsaw Pact conventional forces facing Europe. If the NATO countries were to rely on the Alliance for their security, they would have to maintain roughly equivalent conventional force levels – military mass – to those of the Warsaw Pact.

Faced with the impossibility of doing this (and all European voters knew from personal World War II experience that in a conventional defense two divisions cannot beat ten), most governments responsible for the security of their people would sooner or later have abandoned NATO in favor either of accommodating to the new superior Soviet threat or trying to offset it with independent nuclear capabilities or other arrangements. With reliance on NATO for protection from Soviet aggression being apparently impossible, either of these alternatives would have ended the Alliance before it began.

The dire prospects regarding this surfaced at the Lisbon Conference. The best estimates of force levels (military means) required to hold in Europe clashed with what a NATO Council Committee, appointed to determine what member nations could afford to spend on their national security over the next decade or so, had come up with.

Eisenhower and Montgomery and their staffs produced a plan – "The NATO New Approach" – that proposed changing the Alliance's METHOD of defending Europe. This was to announce that NATO would defend Europe by responding with tactical nuclear firepower from the onset.

This new strategy made the METHOD of defense the key variable rather than the MEANS required. It used the new atomic technology to offset classic conventional mass. This became the NATO Political Directive of 1956 and saved the Alliance as the prime source of security. It bought Western Europe a decade or more of deterrence notwithstanding the unfavorable military balance in conventional forces that was never overcome.

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A point to understand is that there are times when one should use the tactics or doctrine rather than the means as the variable even when the "new approach" has never been tested in practice. We all knew at that time that NATO Europe did not have either suitable atomic weapons – the means – or the necessary atomic land-air doctrines – methods – tested or in place to carry out the new strategy. But this did not matter. What mattered was that every citizen in Europe knew that two divisions could not defeat ten. They did not know, however, whether two backed by atomic firepower could not beat ten or even a hundred. And neither did the Soviets. So on our side the European countries accepted the Alliance for their security. On the Russian side, military leaders no doubt told their political masters: "Sure, we are stronger; but we had better not attack until we find out whether or not tactical nuclear weapons can offset our superior conventional mass – and, if so, get some and learn how to use these in combat." This was a classic example of varying the METHOD – strategy – factor in the basic defense equation to meet a new threat rather than merely demanding more MEANS – forces that the countries could not then afford.

The SDI Example

Another classic and far more recent example of varying the Method rather than the Means can be found in the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposals of 1983.

When Reagan came to office in 1981 the numerical balance in ICBMs was shifting in favor of the Soviets. The new president came into office with a mandate to correct the shifting strategic balance. When it became obvious that the U.S. could not afford to meet this mandate by throwing ever more money at its ICBM forces, and/or by costly passive protection schemes, the obvious option, available from technological progress, was essentially to make obsolete the Soviet missile superiority by building effective U.S. missile defenses. Who cared how many missiles the Soviets built if they could not get to their targets?

This obviously called for a change in the U.S. method – strategy – for providing strategic security. With SDI one would give up seeking protection through the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in favor of real-time protection through Mutual Assured Survival. As in the NATO case, many of us who understood that all

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factors in our basic equation are potential variables pushed for changing U.S. strategy from that of MAD to that of Assured Defense, e.g. SDI, BMD, or whatever one wishes to call it. Not only would this make more military sense, but it would also be far less costly than a multi-billion dollar ICBM arms race with the USSR.

The point of these examples is that all three of our basic defense equation factors must be treated as variables. We must now re-examine the defense JOBS the U.S. must be able to perform in the next century, and the METHODS we should use to do these (i.e., all currently accepted doctrines, strategies , tactics, etc.). Only when this has been done can we arrive at an affordable, optimum, list of MEANS (forces, weapons, etc.) and translate these into truly cost-effective and politically defensible programs with the necessary funding. Any studies that start with the assumption that only the MEANS are subject to change are a waste of time.

On Fully Exploiting Technology

One of the fundamental areas of change that must be dealt with is that of modernizing the entire American defense establishment in keeping with all technological progress to date.

By far the greatest shortcoming in the evolution of today's U.S. national security establishment has been its failure fully to adopt and exploit all of the fruits of technological progress that have come about during and since the Cold War. Contrary to what many people seem to believe, updating defenses for the 21st Century is not merely a question of adjustments to cope with the end of the Cold War and new threats arising since then. It also requires correcting this past failure. Today's strategies, policies, doctrines and defense costs do not even remotely reflect the savings that could be derived from fully exploiting access to space, nuclear and other new weapon systems, real-time worldwide communications, and many lesser developments.

When a new capability that can improve military effectiveness or reduce defense costs becomes available as a result of research and development it should be expeditiously acquired and exploited. Unfortunately, this policy has not prevailed in recent years. Many new inventions, ideas, concepts, products, and capabilities have been studiously ignored or rejected by government agencies even when and where brought about by government research and spending. This shortcoming has been especially prevalent in the defense sector.

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In theory, the defense posture that the U.S. should now adopt ought to be one that is absolutely optimum from two points of view: First, military effectiveness; and second, cost effectiveness. What we now need is the best achievable posture at the least cost. Effectiveness and cost are the two most important criteria in today's security and economic environment. This being true, failure to exploit technological innovations or capabilities that if adopted could greatly reduce cost or improve effectiveness should be unacceptable. If and where this failure occurs, it must be clearly identified and the reasons for accepting the resulting degradation in effectiveness and/or increase in costs publicly justified. Were this done, reasons such as "service tradition," budget equality, service prestige, porkbarrel, or purely political motives such as vested interest arms control aspirations, would become unacceptable.

While most government leaders pay lip service to maximizing effectiveness and economy in defense, the massive waste and ineffectiveness directly attributable to past failure to quickly adopt new technological possibilities continues to plague the United States. For example, billions have been, and continue to be, thrown away in a purely political effort to claim to have protection against ballistic missiles while we are, at the same time, complying with an obsolete (ABM) treaty that says the U.S. should NOT be able to protect its people from ICBMs.

Failure quickly to maximize innovations and new technological possibilities in the defense sector can be traced primarily to four tendencies:

First, the inherent resistance in most large organizations to changes that threaten bureaucratic "rice bowls" or that reduce budgets – and hence power and prestige.

Second, the proclivity on the part of politicians to allow non-defense interests and considerations to impact decisions on weapons and forces that logic and commonsense suggest should be made solely on their national security merits.

Third, the tendency to accept the argument that old capabilities cannot be replaced by new ones until these have been tested in actual combat conditions; and,

Fourth, the increasing political resistance to risk-taking especially in research, development and procurement.

All of these have been further complicated by another phenomenon

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that has hindered the evolution of optimum defense establishments in direct proportion to the rate of technological innovation. This is the human tendency to be more receptive to upgrading military "hardware" such as weapons or machines than to upgrading what, with apologies to computer buffs, I like to call military "software."

The software of warfare are elements such as concepts, strategy, policy, doctrine, organizations, etc. These make up the middle variable in our previously-discussed "defense equation." They are the "methods" adopted to employ the available hardware and manpower. New technologies create new hardware. This in turn creates the prospect of adopting new and better methods of conducting warfare, as was the case in the NATO and SDI examples. Both hardware and software should logically change together. Unfortunately, this rarely occurs , especially in peacetime.

It is normal for most individuals to welcome improvements in hardware while resisting changes in the way of exploiting the new hardware. People like newer, bigger, faster, better cars or weapon systems. They resist notions that they should change their religion, plans, doctrines or ideas. This is the situation in national security today.

Historically the tendency has been at first to exploit any new technological capabilities or systems as the means merely to improve the old way of doing the war-fighting business. Any economies derived from adopting innovations tend to be offset by retaining as much as possible of the old hardware which the new should promptly have replaced. The argument generally used for this is that one cannot rely on the new until it has been tested in actual combat. Obviously this guarantees no substantive changes in peacetime. The result in practice is waste and duplication. While the ability-to-destroy on the part of individual combat aircraft has more than quadrupled in recent years, the numbers of wings, squadrons, carriers, etc., have tended to remain constant. As a result, there has always been a gap between military capabilities at any given time and what they would be if all existing technologies were fully exploited. Before we can design a new national security establishment optimized for cost effectiveness, this gap has to be closed. This is reflected in the well known adage that nations tend to start new wars with the methods found to be successful in the last one. While this may only have resulted in waste and unnecessary losses in past wars, it is a formula

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for defeat in today's world.

During the past three or four decades, technological progress has opened access to space. It has vastly improved much military hardware's range, accuracy, ability-to-penetrate on a global scale, and hence war-waging capability. At the same time, the software of the defense business has tended to remain constant for decades. A classic example is that the service roles and missions defined fifty years ago in the 1946 Defense Re-organization Act are still in vogue in today's space-age U.S. defense establishment.

Even if one were to assume no substantive changes in the threats to the U.S., or in such non-military areas as geo-political changes, population growth and vital resource availability, the backlog of unexploited technological possibilities has created a situation in which merely closing it would result in great improvements in military effectiveness and bring about massive savings in defense spending.

Finally, a realistic approach must be taken to risk-taking. The substitution of computer evaluations for actual hardware tests and the demand for the near-perfection that is required to preclude any possible loss of life in testing new high-tech space systems has made the cost of new systems all but prohibitive. While minimum losses in both hardware and people are desirable goals in war or peace, test pilots are paid to take risks. Today's excessive gold plating and delays attributable solely to political aversion to losing a few American lives violates all logic and commonsense.

Another major factor that relates to risk-taking and that will have to be corrected before the U.S. can define a truly affordable defense program is the "time factor" in the development of almost all weapons systems since the introduction of the McNamara low-risk acquisition policies in the 1960s. Principal among these are: requirements to "fly before buy"; demonstrating all technology to be "in hand" before allowing procurement contracts; the so-called "building block" approach; denying concurrence in development phases or between these and long lead-time procurement contracts; and over-centralization of decision making. Since these policies were adopted in the 1960s they have added billions to the cost of U.S. defenses.

Before McNamara and his whiz-kids came into office in the 1960s, it took most major weapon systems from three to six years to pass from concept to operational use (IOC). With the introduction of the low-risk acquisition policies of the McNamara era, this has increased

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to over ten and often fifteen years even for a modern tank, let alone for space vehicles.

Time is money. The longer the Research, Development, Testing, and Engineering period (RDT&E), the greater the life-cycle cost of the system. Studies have indicated that extending RDT&E adds about 30% per year to these costs. Another massive driver of costs has been the over-centralizing of acquisition decision making. In the days of World War II, decisions such as which fighter or bomber would be built were largely left to the highest qualified authority, such as the Service Chief of Staff responsible for operating the system and who might just have to fly it himself. With the advent of McNamara these decisions were moved up to the Secretary of Defense and other political-appointee levels. Today they are mostly made by people in the White House and Congress or their aides.

Why has moving the decision level upward been so costly? Because the higher the level the less the expertise and likely future operational responsibility. When an unqualified bureaucrat or political appointee becomes responsible for deciding about something about which he knows little or nothing technologically or operations-wise, he quite properly sets up committees, orders trade-off studies, and seeks outside advice (often from vested interests whose priorities differ from that of merely getting the best vehicle or system for its purpose, which is military use). Many of these people are more concerned about avoiding cost overruns that make Congress unhappy than about getting the best weapon. Allowing arms control people to participate in a weapon selection process can theoretically wind up giving the military an aircraft more designed to be seen from satellites than to be aerodynamically sound.

In addition, the McNamara low-risk acquisition approach, still prevalent in DOD, has produced several other undesirable "fringe" effects.

First, the MacNamara demand that all technology be demonstrated to be in hand before procurement is authorized automatically makes most new systems two or three years obsolete on delivery. Why? Because obviously if all technology is in hand before procurement no innovations or advances occurring during the two to three years of production and testing are going to appear in the system except as retrofits.

Second, the building-block approach also introduced in the 1960s

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makes it easy for enemies to see what we are building, steal the key new technology, and build an equally capable system even before we do.

Third, when acquisition exceeds eight years, as is now the case in most major weapon systems, not even a president blessed with two terms in the White House can ever get a new capability on his watch.

Fourth, when Congress enthusiastically funds a new, supposedly secret, advanced development and the Service then waits fifteen or more years to come back for the big procurement money, the Service often finds the sons of members that supported the original proposal laughing it out of the hearings. One cannot expect to maintain support for a classified effort for fifteen years!

The bottom line is that reasonable risk taking is the way to make major savings. Historically, the savings from preventing losses or overruns or periodic failures by trying to dot all "i's" and cross all "t's" before allowing operational procurement are far less than the increase in costs.

Another problem with most recent, post-Cold War, efforts to define a new U.S. security establishment for the next century has been the almost total lack of studies that go back to fundamental commonsense considerations. In addition to the matters mentioned so far, these should address such questions as: What is the purpose of the new military establishment we are trying to create? What is it supposed to do? How can this be measured as compared to its predecessors ? How has technological progress affected the ability to wage wars? What should be the role of disarmament relative to the ability to defend?

In the present situation, until we know and agree upon the role of space in the future overall military posture of nations; until we agree on the importance of military mass (quantity of men and machines) on the likely length of future conflicts, on the relative roles of air, land, sea, and space forces, and on other similar fundamental factors and principles that obviously condition any national security plans and organizations, it makes no sense to try to define an optimum 21st century national security establishment for America. Most papers, recommendations and debates have avoided these types of fundamental questions in recent years. The attitude seems to be that all past answers and solutions are sacrosanct and valid forever. Clausewitz, Mahan, Douhet, the Bible, and the Ten Commandments are

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presumably valid forever -- or at least until losses and defeats in wartime prove that some of the things they dictate have been overtaken by events.

One Way To Get Started

One way to approach this problem is to use the ability-to- destroy as the primary baseline.

The principal purpose of any nation's military forces is to wage war. The ability to wage war effectively requires the ability to destroy targets. What these targets are is not predictable. They depend on the circumstances of the conflict, the situation at the time, and the national goals and purposes to be achieved. What is important is the absolutely *dominant* role that the "ability to destroy" must play in determining the composition of an optimal defense capability.

What It Takes To Destroy Targets

Any nation that has worldwide superiority in the ability to destroy any and all enemy targets while preventing, by enroute destruction or other means, any enemies from destroying targets of interest to itself or its allies will clearly enjoy the best possible security capability.

Under this approach we then can define what is needed in two major categories: offensive and defensive capabilities.

The first relates to being able to initiate the use of military force to achieve national political goals that are unachievable by diplomacy or other peaceful actions. This is generally referred to as "offensive purposes."

The second relates to being able to employ military force to prevent its successful use against the nation, its assets and its allies by opponents who are pursuing political objectives they can't otherwise achieve. This is referred to as being for "defensive purposes."

Any optimal national security establishment must be capable of using force effectively in both roles. Classically, using "force" in a military context involves acts of destruction. Expressed another way, any effective national military capability must by definition include an effective capability to "destroy." The basic requirement is for a cost-effective "ability to destroy." This is inherent in and vital to any effective military establishment.

On the defensive side, a mere ability to deter offensive attacks by being able to retaliate is clearly not acceptable. In addition to

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deterrence, the U.S. defense establishment must possess a valid capability to protect the U.S. proper, and any and all U.S. forces, assets, and major allies, by intercepting and *destroying* weapons and/or forces dispatched against these anywhere in the world.

Any future U.S. national security posture must be capable of both active offensive and defensive measures. While this seems elementary, today's U.S. defense establishment is incapable of intercepting and destroying enemy satellites or other vehicles in space; actively defending the U.S. and its assets against such threats as ballistic missiles; or even actively protecting, and/or replacing in timely fashion, U.S. satellites in space.

If an optimum national security posture is one that can most cost-effectively project destruction for both offensive and defensive purposes, then the principal factors that collectively make up the ability to "destroy" can be used to define, explain and justify that security posture. If these factors can be optimized in terms of the technologies available and the manner of their use, this combination will result in the best national security posture obtainable at any given time. To do this we need a yardstick with which to define the defense establishment's ability to destroy.

The need for a measurable yardstick here is not generally understood. All too many responsible officials, who should know better, still naively assume that if a nation has the largest forces, or the greatest number of weapon systems, it must have the greatest power to destroy targets and win wars. While such a simplistic approach might have had some validity in the past, this is no longer the case. Today, thanks to technological progress, MASS is no longer a major or consistent measurement of military strength.

In order to use the ability to destroy as the new criterion for measuring military capabilities and identifying shortcomings in the defense posture, we must break down destruction into the principal elements that have to be met in order to destroy any or all targets. Common sense suggests that there are four of these:

First, the ability to know where the target is, FIND/SEE.
Second, the ability to get to the target, PENETRATE.
Third, the ability to strike the target to be destroyed, HIT.
Fourth, the ability to destroy any target we hit, KILL.

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In the past, when there was a relatively established relationship between the probability of doing these four steps, and the numbers of men and vehicles it took, national military capabilities could be measured by these numbers.

Today, measuring the means in terms of men and vehicles no longer makes sense. One weapon of mass destruction on an ICBM can do a job that used to take hundreds of bombers. One satellite can locate and keep under surveillance a target that it used to require such things as balloons, hundreds of reconnaisance planes, or conquest and control of the high ground from which it could be seen and hit. Technological prowess has replaced "quantity" as the key factor in cost-effective target destruction.

If one accepts that the "ability to destroy" as the dominant characteristic of any optimum defense establishment, the most effective and affordable national security organization will NOT be the one with the most soldiers, firepower delivery vehicles (ships, planes, tanks, missiles, etc.) or even the greatest mobilization base. Instead, it will be the one that exploits the most current advanced technology available, in the most effective manner possible, to accomplish each of the four tasks that are required for successful destruction.

The very best defense structure will be one in which the latest technology in each of the four building block areas will be fully exploited. Forces, weapons, policies, strategies and doctrines that do not contribute to effectiveness in these areas will then be suspect as being obsolete, redundant or wasteful. In addition, weaknesses and shortcomings in any of the four capabilities indicate priorities for research and development.

In the real world all national defense establishments have additional functions that do not contribute to their basic destructive capabilities. It is important that all such "extracurricular" activities be clearly identified as such and separately justified for whatever mission they have. Doing this will separate the men from the boys when it comes to when and where defense reductions can be made without impairing national security. Defining what is and is not needed on the basis of what it takes to do the destruction also makes it relatively easy to explain to the public and to politicians why whatever posture we come up with is logical and hence is a good candidate for the next century. This is a worthwhile fringe benefit when it comes to

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obtaining funding.

There is nothing really new in this approach other than the semantics. All U.S. services have been doing it for years in a piecemeal, "tree by tree" manner, but without generally recognizing that the key factor is the "ability to destroy and deny destruction." The main disadvantage of this piecemeal approach is that it buries useless, obsolete and wasteful activities and functions in the overall establishment and budget. It doesn't distinguish between what is vital and what is merely the product of vested interests, tradition, politics or plain bureaucratic unwillingness to adopt new technologies at the expense of obsoleting old ones.

Current examples of the subconscious recognition of the importance of the four destruction "building blocks" by the services can be found in the USAF's Global Force Projection claims, which advertise the ability to PENETRATE, and in the classic naval and air goals of controlling the seas, air and space, goals which are obviously prerequisites for FINDING, PENETRATING, and HITTING, while denying these capabilities to opponents. These considerations are also reflected, though in different ways, in the fascination with nuclear proliferation and with SDI.

By the optimized use of advanced technology to see, reach, hit and destroy incoming missiles, SDI vastly increases national security. Why have nuclear devices been made central to it? Because they provide the ultimate in the ability to meet the requirements of the fourth "building block" while offsetting shortcomings in meeting the first and third. Their area-effects accomplish the latter while their destructive power optimizes the former.

The Mass Factor

Probably the most fundamental cause of waste in defense spending today lies in the United States' inability to reduce the "mass" factor in its defense establishment commensurately with improvements in the ability to destroy targets. Technological progress made in being able to hit targets should permit massive force reductions in the levels maintained in peacetime, in the levels needed in wartime, and in the size and nature of any mobilization base. But this will only occur if the new technological capabilities are introduced generally. Since this is not being done in future U.S. defense force plans, it is clearly a major WASTE FACTOR.

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These are hard issues to get both the military and politicians to look at seriously. The recent Gulf War demonstrated this. The mission was to reverse the invasion of Kuwait. The U.S. dispatched thousands of troops from all services. But the job was all but done with a few air and cruise missile strikes on selected targets; all the "mass" hardly fought at all. These were then justified as essential to the liberation and occupation of IRAQ. But this was never the mission; nor was it done. Numbers were not needed. The western powers had the firepower to send the entire nation of Iraq back to the Stone Age. Those nations' basic national security was only threatened by their own political decisions when it came to target selection, not by any inability to destroy. If needed, the U.S. could have used ICBMs. If they are not needed, why have them? If we tie our hands for political reasons, how much are we willing to pay for doing the job the hard way?

Those who generally ignore the impact of improved ability-to-destroy on force requirements amusingly embrace it where costs give them no alternative. As to bombers, the higher unit cost and longer production cycle have forced a trade-off in quantities claimed needed. This is in contradiction to the Mass requirements that are still argued for for other means of target destruction. Now a dozen or so B-1's or B-2's are deemed effective in projecting global power. How is it that a few of these can do the job that used to justify hundreds of B-52's and, before that, thousands of B-17's? If this great quantity reduction is now possible as a result of improved abilities to find, penetrate, hit and kill targets, how is it that it does not apply in the case of the inventories maintained in missiles, carriers, ships, etc.?

Examples of Commonsense Conclusions

Defining the most cost-effective U.S. military establishment for the 21st Century in any great detail will take a vast effort on the part of many experts. This could be compared to designing a perfect forest with an optimum mix in size and variety of trees and to deciding where each is to be located. No one paper or article can usefully attempt to do this until and unless fundamental issues such as the size, shape and nature of the forest, its soil and weather conditions, and other basic overall parameters have first been clearly established.

Unfortunately, would-be defense planners tend to start with the trees, and ignore basic considerations, which should come first.

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When this problem is approached from the wrong way, picking, fighting over and planting trees at random generally results in an excellent selection of individual trees clustered in a useless, ugly and very costly wooded area that is of little use for the purpose it is designed for.

Applying this analogy to defense establishments, the number one requirement for our 21st century establishment is that it be optimized for effectiveness. If we then postulate that the job is to be able to destroy any and all objectives on a global basis, and in real-time or as close to it as possible, we know that it must be allowed to exploit fully the latest technology.

The number two requirement is that, whatever 21st century national security structure we adopt to meet our first requirement for optimal effectiveness in accomplishing destruction, it must be able to do this at the least possible cost. In brief, effectiveness is the first criterion and minimizing cost is second only to this requirement.

At any point in time there can only be, in theory, one national security structure that is optimal in terms of cost-effectiveness in relation to its ability to destroy targets. This capability, however, results from a combination of two basic elements: (1) the military forces and weapons required to do the destruction – WHAT we have to do the job with; and (2) the tactics, doctrines, and strategies we use – HOW we go about doing the job. Any optimum capability must use the very best hardware available at the time in the most economical and effective manner.

Military and technological capabilities must be optimized in locating and observing. Failure to exploit capabilities here can be wasteful and costly and can jeopardize potential success. The same goes for reporting what is visible. This simple logic tells us that the fullest exploitation of the latest and highest "ground" (which is now space) must characterize an efficient 21st Century military capability. The same applies to real-time reporting to users (those charged with the target destruction).

Conclusion

The above areas where study is needed are offered merely as examples of some of the fundamentals that need to be looked at. They represent areas in which today's defense establishment has deviated from either commonsense or the fullest use of technology.

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The goal must be an optimum defense posture. Today's defense establishment has become such an admixture of forces, weapons organizations and doctrines – many militarily sound but others traceable to politics, vested interests, minority opinions, and tradition or prestige – that it is almost impossible to separate the two. Until and unless they are separated, there is no possibility of a truly cost-effective defense establishment for the next century.

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Post-Independence Opportunism and Democratization in Africa

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Since the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent cessation of superpower rivalry, many dictatorships in Africa have been replaced by democratically-elected governments. Post-independence opportunism, including bureaucratic corruption, allowed a few individuals and groups to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the people. Many of these individuals now occupy positions of power in the African countries. Under existing institutional arrangements, these public positions provide their holders with enormous economic benefits and privileges. Consequently, individuals who hold these positions view effective policy reform as a threat to their privileges and unlikely to support democratization and other efforts to provide the African peoples with more viable constitutional rules. However, in order for Africans to provide themselves with viable economic markets, they must engage in reform to provide their societies with viable economic markets and efficient constitutional rules.

In the 1970s, a wave of institutional reforms and transition to more accountable governmental systems began in the Iberian peninsula, spread to Latin America and Asia, and by the late 1980s socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was in crisis. Eventually, the Soviet Union disintegrated. These events in Eastern Europe have had a significant impact on the democratization movement in Africa. In the early 1990s, Africans of all walks of life, tired of living under inefficient and oppressive institutional arrangements, were actively seeking a change in the

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status quo (Decalo, 1992; Uwarzurike, 1990). Basically, the demonstrators were asking for a complete and effective reform of the rules that regulate socio-political interactions in order to establish (1) political and governmental systems that are accountable and accessible to the people; and (2) economic systems that provide all citizens unrestricted access to markets. Perhaps, most important of all, Africans had become tired of "rule by men" (which, since independence, has been arbitrary and capricious) and now sought "rule by law. " Thus, the emphasis of the mass demonstrations of the 1990s was on the reform of existing laws and institutions to provide the African societies with more efficient and viable rules.

The impetus for the recent interest in institutional reform in Africa came from both internal and external sources. Events that began in Iberia in the 1970s have had a significant impact on Africa's democratization and market reform program. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent cessation of superpower rivalry, Africa lost most of its importance to the West and the former Soviet bloc. As a result, many political dictatorships in Africa, some of which had been supported by the West and its allies, and others by the Soviet Union, lost the financial and military assistance they had been receiving from these sources. Without such flows of funds and equipment, the leaders of these regimes were no longer able to hold on to power. The loss of Soviet military and development assistance contributed significantly to the fall of several Afro-Marxist regimes in the continent, notably those in Somalia and Ethiopia. After the collapse of their ideological models in Eastern Europe, it was very difficult for the continent's Afro-Marxist regimes to maintain their existence (Decalo, 1992; Mbaku, 1994a).

In the last three decades, the majority of the African countries significantly increased their levels of external indebtedness, and by the mid-1980s, increasing external debt had become a major constraint to economic growth and development in the continent. In the midst of deteriorating economic and social conditions, African countries with high levels of debt, must continue to send scarce foreign exchange abroad to meet debt obligations. As a result, scarce resources, which could otherwise be

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used to import essential inputs for domestic industrial projects or to maintain (and perhaps increase) spending on social programs, are used to service the debt. Much research has been done to determine the effects of debt on human development in Africa (UNDP, 1990; Ihonvbere, 1994; Bradshaw and Tshandu, 1990; Cheru, 1989; Shepherd, 1990). Basically, the continued outflow of resources from the continent in the form of debt service represents an important constraint to economic growth and development.

Increasing debt levels and dwindling export earnings have forced many African countries to turn to conditionality lending. In recent years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has increased its involvement in conditional lending to the African countries. Many foreign lenders, including private financial institutions, now consider IMF approval an important part of the loan application of many African countries. To qualify for IMF approval for additional loans, the African country must agree to undertake a basket of policy reforms which usually include, the reduction of the size of the public sector, devaluation of the national currency, deregulation of the international trade sector, and greater reliance on markets for the allocation of resources. As a result of these developments, the IMF and the World Bank have become increasingly involved in the movement to reform Africa's political and economic institutions (Cheru, 1989; Shaw, 1991; Weissman, 1990).

In this new approach, the resource allocation system and the degree of democracy in a country have become yardsticks to determine which country should be granted aid. Those developing countries that have more democratic and accountable governmental systems and economic systems in which resource allocation is based on market principles are favored in aid distributions (Decalo, 1992).

Under colonial rule, economic institutions were shaped primarily by European settlers and members of the colonial administration. With independence, therefore, there was an effort by some Africans to rid themselves of colonial rule and establish more participatory political and economic institutions. Shortly after independence, however, governmental systems in many African countries degenerated into instruments for the enrichment

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of politically-dominant groups. As a result, a few individuals and groups came to dominate resource allocation, and as was the case during colonialism, the bulk of the African peoples were denied effective access to both political and economic markets.

At independence, many indigenous leaders argued that the institutions which their countries had inherited from the Europeans were ill-suited for their new countries. They subsequently adopted political and economic systems which they believed would allow the state to more effectively deal with issues of poverty and deprivation. As the last thirty years have shown, few African countries have succeeded in significantly improving national standards of living. Instead, many African societies are today pervaded by high levels of poverty and material deprivation, bureaucratic corruption, nepotism, and political violence. The present reform movement is aimed at providing societies in the continent with efficient and viable laws and institutions. The latter are expected to improve bureaucratic efficiency, provide more accountable and participatory governmental systems, and significantly improve the ability of all citizens to participate in economic activities. This paper will show that effective policy reform to establish such efficient institutions could be derailed by entrenched special-interest groups which currently benefit significantly from the monopolization of political power and as a consequence, resource allocation.

Independence and the Adoption of Inefficient Rules

Independence provided Africans an opportunity to adopt new laws and institutions to provide the enabling environment for sustainable development in the post-independence made possible by the departure of the Europeans was not used effectively to provide African societies with the kinds of institutions that would have maximized individual participation in national development. Instead, the rules adopted at independence were inefficient, weak, and not particularly viable. As a consequence, they were easily subverted by interest groups seeking opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society. Political economy in the post-independence society, thus, has been characterized by high levels of opportunism promoted by individuals and groups

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interested in redistributing wealth and income in their favor. Opportunism, as used here, includes bureaucratic corruption, political violence and other behaviors designed to help individuals and groups subvert the laws for their own benefit.

European colonies were established in Africa through the annexation of African lands. As a result, the institutions that accompanied these colonizers could hardly be described as democratic. To improve their ability to exploit the resources of the new territories, the Europeans brought together many population groups with distinct languages, cultures, and social systems to form colonial economic and political systems that could only be held together through the use of a significant level of force (Morrison, et al., 1989, p. 236). Colonial laws and institutions, thus, were not designed to improve the participation of the indigenous peoples in the economic and political affairs of the colonies, but to help European entrepreneurs effectively exploit the resources of the African territories.

When it became evident that the African colonies would be granted independence, the Europeans implemented a reform program that was unable to effectively address the participation of Africans in the post-independence economic and governmental systems. According to Fatton (1990, p. 457), these reforms did not allow for the "fundamental transformation in the economic, cultural, or bureaucratic domain." Although the institutions that the Europeans left in the newly-independent African countries could be described as parliamentary systems of government and market-oriented economies, they were potentially unstable. More important, however, was the fact that during colonization the Europeans had in general failed to encourage the development of an independent indigenous elite capable of effectively managing a transition to post-independence liberal democracy and free markets. In fact, many of the institutions established with the help of the Europeans collapsed shortly after independence and from them emerged several forms of military and civilian dictatorships (Sundhaussen, 1991; Fatton, 1990; Mbaku, 1995).

Furthermore, the laws and institutions of the new countries were not developed to reflect local ideals, needs, traditions, or aspirations. The rules selected lacked the legitimacy that derives

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from the "understanding and voluntary acceptance of the constitution by the people as the prescription for settling conflict within society" (Sundhaussen, 1991, p. 108). The majority of the African constitutions were based on European models and quite often were not sufficiently adjusted to reflect African realities and meet the needs of the people. In addition, conferences to design these documents were held primarily in Europe, with the interests of the indigenous peoples represented by urban elites, most of whom had been educated in the metropolitan countries, and had accepted European culture and political norms and beliefs. These urban elites were usually not well informed on conditions in the rural areas of their respective countries and often had objectives and interests that differed significantly from those of their peasant countrymen. Given these conditions, the design of rules generally excluded a significant part of national political opinion, and the constitutions adopted at independence were inappropriate and hence not efficient (see, for example, Cowen, 1961 for the development of the first constitution of the Union of South Africa; LeVine, 1964, and Enonchong, 1967 for the design of Cameroon's first constitution).

It has been argued that many of the constitutions that the African countries adopted at independence were products of political exigency (see, for example, LeVine, 1964). As the argument goes, Africans, eager to gain independence, were willing to forego effective constitutional discourse in an effort to accelerate the process and pace of decolonization. It was generally believed that after independence and the capture of the apparatus of state by indigenous elites, effective constitutional discourse would be undertaken to select appropriate and efficient rules to regulate socio-political interaction in the post-independence society. Such reform of the rules was rarely undertaken, since shortly after independence, political coalitions which had captured the apparatus of government proceeded to employ the latter as an instrument for enriching themselves. Thus, any attempts at effective reform were regarded as a threat on their privileges and were usually resisted. In countries such as Nigeria, Zaire, and Libya, where military elites had captured the apparatus of government, rule was strictly by degree with the constitution

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suspended. Several countries attempted constitutional reforms but efforts were either unsuccessful, or produced laws and institutions that were not any more efficient or viable than those adopted at independence. Today, most Africans operate under constitutional rules that at@ weak, inefficient and not particularly viable. These rules have allowed a few political coalitions b monopolize politics and resource allocation (see, for example, Mbaku, 1994a, 1994b).

Problems of Resource Allocation in Post-Independence Africa: The Benefits of Political Power

During the struggle for independence, many African nationalists argued that most of the poverty among the indigenous peoples was attributable to colonial institutions. The latter, the nationalists argued, allowed most income generated in the colonial economy to accrue to European entrepreneurs, leaving the majority of Africans poor and severely deprived. Many Africans consequently believed that political autonomy would provide them the opportunity to design institutions which would provide the state with the wherewithal to significantly improve the national welfare. As a result, after independence and the capture of the apparatus of government by indigenous elites, many African countries chose statism as their development path. Control of resource allocation by the state was expected to help Africans overcome the development constraints imposed on them by many years of colonial rule. Many of the new leaders pointed to the vicious cycle of poverty in their respective economies as the main reason for state intervention, claiming that statism would allow the government to siphon the profits which, during colonialism, had accrued to European entrepreneurs and divert these resources to improve the standard of living of the indigenous peoples (Mbaku, 1991, pp. 181-194).

But this reliance on statism in many African countries has produced several outcomes, most of which have become obstacles to economic and human development. First, statism has placed a significant amount of public resources under the direct control of civil servants, allowing them to manipulate policy outcomes to benefit themselves at the expense of the rest of the people. Second, bureaucrats have successfully used the state's regulatory

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and redistributive powers to create monopoly positions benefiting themselves and their families. Third, excessive state control and regulation has politicized resource allocation systems. In the latter, the profitability of forms is determined by the political system. Since state subsidies, discretionary tax relief, and other forms of regulation, instead of managerial expertise and competition, emerged as the primary determinants of firm profitability, rent seeking, including bureaucratic corruption, became pervasive. Thus, in the post-independence period, most African entrepreneurs have devoted a significant portion of their resources and effort to lobbying and bribing politicians and civil servants in order to maximize profit. As a result, production efficiency has suffered significantly.

In addition, corruption has become a major obstacle to development (Mbaku and Paul, 1989; Gould, 1980; Gould and Mukendi, 1989; LeVine, 1975). Fourth, statism has increased the cost of operating in the formal sector of many African economies (Kimenyi, 1991). To minimize the burden of state regulations on their enterprises, many African entrepreneurs have chosen exit into the underground or informal sector. Those who remain in the formal sector must engage in the bribery of civil servants and other members of the enforcement community in order to survive. The mass exodus of many enterprises from the formal sectors of the African economies has eroded national tax bases and resulted in significant shortfalls in public revenues.

State control and economic planning are now regarded by many researchers as major constraints to economic development in Africa (Ergas, 1986; Mbaku, 1988; World Bank, 1981). Finally, post-independence statism has turned the apparatus of state in many African countries into politically-dominant group. According to Agbese (1992), in the last several years, political coalitions in Nigeria have been engaged in determined efforts to capture the apparatus of government in order to employ the latter's redistributive powers to effect wealth and income transfers in their favor. Once political power is captured, the successful group closes all enemy channels and effectively prevents all other groups from gaining access to both political and economic markets. Post-independence African institutions have endowed those who hold

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political power with a significant level of economic benefits. Since the state controls an enormous amount of resources and is the most important economic unit, the group that captures the state has control over all these resources. Those who attempt to reform the nation's laws and provide the people with greater access to economic and political markets will be termed enemies of the state. Reforms, if successful, would eliminate privileges for members of the ruling coalition. In the present reform effort in the continent, a significant level of opposition to reforms comes from those who hold privileged positions in both the political and economic institutions of the African countries. These individuals view effective reform of existing rules as a threat to their rent-seeking ability and their wealth position.

Nigeria is not the only African country in which the apparatus of state has become an instrument for the enrichment of members of the ruling coalition. South Africa, which for many years, was regarded by many Westerners as a bastion of capitalism and democracy in the continent, promoted markets in which the redistributive powers of the state were used on a regular basis to transfer wealth from the black majority to the white (Hazlett, 1988; Mbaku, 1993). Under the apartheid system, a myriad of laws was used to significantly reduce the participation of the nation's black population in economic and political affairs.

However, from Algeria to Zaire, political coalitions have captured the apparatus of government and used it enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the people. Under the laws and institutions that exist in these countries, civil servants and politicians are able to promote perverse economic policies, which while impoverishing the people, provide concentrated and substantial benefits to the elites. In the present struggle to implement effective policy reforms in Africa, incumbents who currently benefit from existing laws and institutions, have become the most ardent opponents of the transition (see, for example, Mbaku, 1994a, 1994b).

The emergence of the state as the most important economic unit in the African countries has had a very important impact on politics in these societies. In many instances, incumbents have become very repressive in order to continue to maintain a

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monopoly on power and thus continue to preside over the allocation of resources. Politics, thus, is regarded by many Africans as an important investment. Given that the state is the largest employer and the most important source of wealth, the strategy is to capture the state and use its coercive force to crush one's opponents while at the same time, redistributing wealth in one's favor (Ihonvbere and Ekekwe, 1988, p. 288). The absence of effective constitutional methods of regime change has meant that Africans interested in capturing the government must resort to violence. As a result, political violence, including military coups, has become endemic to the region (see, for example, Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990. 1992; Mbaku, 1994b). In general, in the post-independence period, the African countries have spent significant effort to develop the institutions of state coercion but have not been able to develop avenues for popular participation. Although the former institutions are important for regime security and the maximization of resource flows to members of the ruling coalition, the latter are vital to national integration, the effective participation of the people in economic and human development, and the practice of political democracy.

The Importance of Effective Rules

In every society, it is to the benefit of individuals to adopt a set of rules governing their socio-political interaction. The rules chosen form the foundation for society's institutional arrangements and provide a means for the peaceful resolution of conflict. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1985), the rules that regulate the behavior of individuals within a society are important and determine how people and organizations behave. In the African countries, bureaucratic corruption has emerged as an important obstacle to development. The behavior of civil servants and the entrepreneurs who bribe them can only be understood within the context of existing rules. Thus, to understand why corruption and other opportunistic behaviors have become endemic to post-independence Africa, requires a thorough examination of the laws and institutions of these countries. As has been shown elsewhere, bureaucratic corruption is an opportunistic or rent-seeking behavior that is related to state intervention in

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economic activities (Mbaku, 1992).

Effective and efficient rules offer individuals within society an opportunity to pursue their private objectives in such a way that they do not infringe on the ability of others to do likewise. Rules that regulate socio-political relationships can be explicit (e. g- a written constitution) or based on custom and tradition. Given an existing set of rules, opportunism can be described as behavior designed to improve one's welfare at the expense of society and involves such activities as shirking, adverse selection, moral hazard, corruption, and free riding (Ostrom, et al., 1993, pp. 43-72). Those who engage in opportunism, such as civil servants, benefit significantly from these activities. For example, through corruption, the African civil servant can increase his level of compensation above and beyond the legal limit. The entrepreneur who pays the bribe to the civil servant benefits also. In addition to gaining access to lucrative monopoly positions created by government intervention in economic activities, the entrepreneur who bribes civil servants also minimizes the burden of state regulations on his enterprises. Corruption provides politicians with the resources they need to buy regime security and continue to monopolize power. In addition to the fact that corruption allows inefficient producers to remain in business indefinitely, it encourages the government to promote perverse economic policies which destroy the national welfare but provide bureaucrats and politicians with opportunities to enrich themselves through the extortion of bribes from those seeking government favors. In the post-independence African society, corruption has distorted economic incentives and discouraged entrepreneurship, making the development of viable and sustainable economic systems quite difficult (Mbaku, 1992; Gould, 1980).

Corruption and other attempts to use the government to enrich the politically dominant groups can be viewed as problems of constitutional maintenance. After rules have been selected and a government established, political coalitions then seek to capture the apparatus of state and use it's redistributive power to amass wealth for themselves. Even if the rules selected and adopted by society are efficient and as a result, generate mutual gains for all members of society, opportunism will still be a problem in the

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post-constitutional society. To make certain that opportunism is minimized in the post-contractual period, an efficient and effective enforcement system must be established to enforce compliance and cooperation. Unfortunately, third-party enforcement of constitutional contracts is usually unreliable, inefficient, and not particularly effective. Many scholars have suggested that national judiciary systems and the police be given authority to serve as counteracting agencies that can enforce cooperation and compliance in the post-constitutional society and minimize behaviors such as corruption. In Africa and other developing countries, these institutions are pervaded by high levels of corruption and are themselves not properly constrained by the law. In addition, they are susceptible to manipulation by interest groups. As a result, judges and policemen in these countries are not very appropriate agents for the enforcement of constitutional rules.

Recent research has produced a theory of constitutional maintenance whose main focus is the elimination of opportunism in the post-contractual society (Anderson and Hill, 1986; Buchanan and Faith, 1987; Niskanen, 1990; Wildavsky, 1990). It is generally believed that if the rules selected were self-enforcing, most opportunities for opportunism would be eliminated. One can make a constitution self-enforcing by endowing it with principles and procedures that introduce, maintain and enhance political and economic competition in the post-constitutional society. During constitutional negotiations, an effort is made to provide for competitive markets in the post-contractual period. An important characteristic of a self-enforcing constitution is its ability to put restraints on governmental Leviathan and subsequently limit the exercise of government agency. If the constitution constrains the ability of the state to intervene in economic markets and thus, its ability to redistribute income and wealth, political groups would find it very difficult to engage in rent seeking and other efforts to effect inefficient redistributions.

In Africa today, corruption is one of the most significant problems retarding development. Several reasons have been advanced to explain the pervasive nature of corruption in the continent (see, for example, Gould, 1980; Gould and Mukendi,

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1989; Werlin, 1972, 1973; LeVine, 1975; MacGaffey, 1983). Public choice theory views corruption as an opportunistic behavior and thus is related to the existing laws and institutions in a society. Specifically, bureaucratic corruption is related to the control and regulation of economic activities by the government. After the rules have been selected and the government established, there is an incentive for political groups to capture the state and use its redistributive powers to enrich themselves. Basically, interest groups attempt to manipulate policy outcomes within existing rules to effect wealth and income redistributions in their favor. Unless the rules adopted earlier effectively constrain the ability of the government to intervene in private exchange, civil servants will be able to extort bribes from individuals and groups seeking government favors (including avoiding heavy taxation of their enterprises and the gaining of access to lucrative monopoly positions created by state regulations).

Opportunism and the Current Reform Effort

Today, Africans have another opportunity to select new laws and institutions to guide economic and human development in the next century. The rules chosen must be capable of minimizing opportunism and maximizing the contributions of Africans to national development. Unfortunately, many incumbents, who presently benefit significantly from the existing set of rules see changes in the laws and institutions as a threat to their privileges. From Algeria to Zaire, dominant political groups have continued to mount opposition to the reforms, primarily because they see the introduction of efficient political and economic systems as reducing their ability to engage in the inefficient redistributions that have allowed them to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society.

Post-independence opportunism has created two major problems for the reform effort in Africa today. First, through rent seeking, power and economic resources have been concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and groups. As a result, these Politically-dominant groups can use these resources to effectively block reforms. This is particularly so in countries such as Nigeria and Zaire where well-placed military elites have effectively

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hijacked the transition programs of these countries and are attempting to manipulate them to ensure their continued monopolization of power. Second, post-independence opportunism, which encouraged the promotion of perverse economic policies, has significantly increased the incidence of poverty and material deprivation among the masses. These disaffected people, most of whom struggle constantly in order to meet their daily basic needs, are not likely to actively participate in the transition. Yet, their participation is very essential if these countries are to design effective laws and institutions to guide socio-political interaction in the new century. In fact, the participation of all citizens is very important for the development of appropriate and viable institutions. As Brennan and Buchanan (1985, p. 27) have stated, in order for a set of rules to be effective and efficient, the terms of the agreement must be accepted by all members of the polity to be governed by the rules. Thus, the participation of all the people in the design of rules is essential for such unanimous agreement to be obtained. Unfortunately, in many African countries, post-independence opportunism has created severe inequalities in the distribution of resources and today, many African countries suffer from high rates of unemployment, and distrust of the system of resource allocation because it is viewed as an instrument for the enrichment of the elites and other members of the ruling coalition. According to Szabo (1992, p. 4-3), "the political consequence of economic and social crises is a low level of political participation, especially in elections." Hunger, high levels of poverty and material deprivation tend to alienate the masses from the political process and those who currently manage it. Thus, the continent's relatively weak economic markets, a vicious cycle of poverty and other social ills, make participation of the masses in political activities difficult. Today, opportunism, including bureaucratic corruption, which has allowed certain individuals and groups to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society, represents an important constraint to the present reform movement in the continent. Yet, if Africa is to avoid the development problems of the last several decades, it must engage in effective reform of its laws and institutions in order to provide appropriate incentives for economic and human development in

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the new century.

Summary and Concluding Statements

In the last few years, many of Africa's dictatorships have collapsed and have been replaced by democratically-elected governments. The continent appears to be on its way to building democratic and accountable governmental systems. It seems that Africans may finally engage in the type of constitutional discourse and rule selection that they were unable to undertake at independence. This article has argued that post-independence opportunism, including bureaucratic corruption, has allowed certain individuals and groups to amass wealth for themselves. Many of these individuals now occupy important political and military positions in their respective countries. Under existing constitutional rules, these political positions provide their holders with significant economic benefits. As a result, the individuals who hold these positions see effective policy reform as a threat to their lucrative positions and are unlikely to support democratization and other efforts to deregulate markets. In order for the African countries to build accessible and accountable democratic systems, and develop viable economic markets, they must engage in reform to provide their societies with effective and efficient constitutional rules. Unless such reforms are undertaken and a viable set of rules adopted for each country, opportunism would continue to pervade these countries and Africans will continue to live in societies characterized by high levels of political violence, underdevelopment and poverty.

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Rational Ignorance, Deceptive Advertising, and the Size of Government

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Whether democratic governments tend to be "too large" or "too small" has been an enduring question in both the popular and academic press. Arguments that they grow too large center around "the incentives to use a political mechanism to redistribute wealth."[1] Arguments that they remain too small rely on the assumed existence of "highly effective machinery for synthesizing private wants,"[2] whereas "no similar process operates on behalf of the nonmerchantable services of the state."[3] The answer to the question has been framed as resting on the balance of these two forces.

However, while the wealth redistribution based argument for the tendency toward overlarge government appears valid, the opposing argument, correctly conceived, seems seriously flawed. A reexamination of its information-based argument reveals that pervasive, deceptive "advertising" on behalf of government policies can accentuate the tendency of the state to grow too large, rather than causing it to be too small.

Rational Voter Ignorance

The wealth redistribution arguments for the tendency of governments to grow too large start with the hypothesis that voters will rationally be relatively less informed about their political decisions than about comparable private market decisions (termed

[1] Sam Peltzman, "The Growth of Government," *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 23(2):209-288 (October 1980), p. 209.

[2] John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society*, 3rd revised edition (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p.196.

[3] ibid, p. 198.

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rational voter ignorance), because of differences in the incentive structures between the two arenas. In making their private market decisions, people acquire information only so long as they expect the additional benefits from a better choice to exceed the additional costs of obtaining the information necessary to make it. People follow the same calculus in making their public sector decisions, but both the benefits and costs of acquiring information differ in systematic ways from the private market case. For public sector decisions, the benefits associated with becoming better informed are typically lower and the costs of acquiring that information are higher, with the result that relative voter ignorance is rational in the political arena.

The primary benefit of becoming better informed and thus casting a better vote is the effect that it has on the political outcome. However, while this benefit can be substantial in mar-ket decisions (because the decision maker both captures the gains from making good decisions and bears the costs both of deciding and of suboptimal choices), the fact that one person's vote is but one among many gives him only a minute chance of influencing the outcome in the political arena. Hence making a better informed vote yields virtually no benefits from better public choices to the voter. The cost of acquiring the relevant information for public sector decisions, on the other hand, tends to be much higher, largely because a great deal more information is required than simply knowing the direct effects on oneself, and because much of it is of a type that requires scientific research to establish.

For example, compare the amount and sophistication of the knowledge required to make an informed decision about alternative national health insurance policies with that of selecting your own private insurance plan. In selecting your own plan, you already know your health history and family tendencies, and you need not worry about the effects of your choices on others. But in considering national policies, you must deal with all the health issues facing anyone, as well as with issues such as a large number of relevant elasticities of supply and demand, adverse selection, moral hazard, technological changes in medicine, etc. The combination of higher costs and lower benefits to becoming informed

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means that most voters will know less about political decisions, and will analyze what information they have less carefully, than in their market behavior.

Special Interest And the Underinformed Electorate

Because the government can redistribute income in a non-voluntary manner by majority rule (i.e., policies I object to can be imposed on me), in contrast to the mutually beneficial, voluntary exchanges of the market, rational voter ignorance leads to attempts by special interest groups to benefit themselves at the expense of the underinformed electorate. Groups whose members each stand to gain substantially are rationally much better informed about a particular policy than voters in general, each of whom stands to lose only a little and whose costs of effective opposition tends to exceed the costs the policy will impose on him.

However, these groups must achieve majority support within the government, which leads to both implicit and explicit log-rolling (trading support so as to create a majority from a group of minorities, and excluding others from an effective voice in policy determination) and other manifestations of interest group politics.[4] This can and does lead to majority passage of government policies that do not even command majority approval, much less the unanimous approval characteristic of voluntary exchange, hence to an overlarge government more attuned to wealth redistribution than to advancing the "general welfare."

Against this argument for an overlarge (or, perhaps better, overmeddlesome) government, two different but complementary information-based arguments that the government will tend to be too small in a democracy have been made. One, originating with Anthony Downs, assumes that voters will have much better information about the costs (e.g., taxes) than about the often remote, hidden and uncertain benefits of government activity, leading political parties to propose budgets that are smaller than they

[4] See, for example, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962), chapters 9, 10, and 14.

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would be if voters were informed as to those benefits.[5] The other, originating with John Kenneth Galbraith, is that "advertising operates exclusively...on behalf of privately produced goods and services. Since management of demand and emulative effects operate on behalf of private production, public services will have an inherent tendency to lag behind...demand which is expensively synthesized will inevitably have a much larger claim on income than...where no such influence operates."[6]

Too Much Government

The literature following these seminal arguments has tended to assume they oppose one another and to focus on which effect is stronger in determining whether they lead to a government being too large or too small.[7] However, a strong case can be made that the wealth redistribution and advertising/information bias effects, properly understood, are complementary rather than opposed, and that both lead to too much government.[8]

The basis of the argument that the advertising/information bias reinforces the redistribution bias toward an overlarge government begins with the fact that "lobbying and public relations by government agencies and their suppliers and free press cover-age of proposed government projects are at present *functional equivalents* of private advertising activity."[9] Given that the government therefore engages in tremendous amounts of advertising, we must further recognize that promoters of political "solutions" are far less constrained to tell the truth in their promotional claims than are private firms. "[I]t is not clear ...that business firms have an undue

[5] Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy," *World Politics*: 541-562 (1960) and *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, Harper and Row, 1957).

[6] John Kenneth Galbraith, op. cit., p. 198.

[7] See, for example, Ryan Amacher, Robert Tollison, and Thomas Willett, "A Budget Size in a Democracy: A Review of the Arguments," *Public Finance Quarterly* 3(2):99-121 (April 1975).

[8] As the furor over federal regulations and unfunded mandates makes clear, the size of a government's budget can far understate the extent to which the government controls the allocation of resources.

[9] Amacher, et al, ibid, p. 101.

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advantage in want-creating activity. Washington enjoys free press and TV coverage and is immune from anti-fraud laws. Professional promoters are protected from the same laws by the camouflage of academic freedom."[10] When this weakened "truth in advertising" constraint is combined with rational voter ignorance (in particular, the fact that the majority of voters will evaluate the arguments for public sector involvement less carefully than they would private sector advertising), the result is that vast resources are devoted to misleading the public by plausible sounding understatements of the costs and overstatements of the benefits of government programs. "Political speeches (as well as newspaper editorials) often rely on slogans, oversimplications, inadequate theories, and misleading facts. Voters lack the necessary information to evaluate the assertions made by politicians, which in turn gives politicians little incentive to achieve accuracy and balance in their views."[11]

This enlarges the government domain, because the same rational voter ignorance that leads to this "false advertising" makes it almost impossible to effectively combat its effects, since most voters won't, as a result, "waste" their time listening, reading or thinking very hard about the true effects of government policies.

> It is often sadly remarked that the bad economists present their errors to the public better than the good economists present their truths. It is often complained that demagogues can be more plausible in putting forward economic nonsense from the platform than the honest men who try to show what is wrong with it. But the basic reason for this ought not to be mysterious. The reason is that the demagogues and bad economists are presenting half-truths. They are speaking only of the immediate effect of a proposed policy or its effect upon a single group. As far as they go they may often be right. In these cases the answer consists in showing that the proposed

[10] Harold Demsetz, "Discussion: Economics in the New Industrial State," *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* 60(2):481-484 (May 1970), p. 483.

[11] Edgar Browning and Jacqueline Browning, *Public Finance and the Price System*, 4th edition (New York, Macmillan, 1994) p. 78.

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> policy would also have longer and less desirable effects, or that it could benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The answer consists in supplementing and correcting the half-truth with the other half. But to consider all the chief effects of a proposed course on everybody often requires a long, complicated, and dull chain of reasoning. Most of the audience finds this chain of reasoning difficult to follow and soon becomes bored and inattentive. The bad economists rationalize this intellectual debility and laziness by assuring the audience that it need not even attempt to follow the reasoning or judge it on its merits because it is only "classicism" or "laissez-faire" or "capitalist apologetics" or whatever other term of abuse may happen to strike them as effective.[12]

Politicians are under constant pressure to justify their existence by doing something to "solve" whatever manifestation of scarcity currently tops the public's consciousness. As they compete to show their political leadership, they try very hard to "sell" their political solution to the public. So do all those who stand to gain substantially from it, because they are rat-ionally well informed of what's in it for them.

Political Rhetoric and False Advertising

This leads proponents to advertise (largely at taxpayer expense, by such means as public hearings and constituent newsletters covered by franking privileges) every alleged benefit for which a plausible sounding case can be made, tailored to an audience of voters who won't think too hard about them, because they don't anticipate any benefit from doing so. The result is that politicians and their supporters can tout their policies with laundry lists including every conceivable benefit, because the cost to them of conjuring up such a list is near zero (taking only a few seconds to invent and a few more seconds of free air time to propose). At the same time, they tend to omit (or impose on others) as many of the costs as possible. This works primarily because rationally

[12] Henry Hazlitt, *Economics in One Lesson* (New York, Arlington House, 1979), pp. 18-19.

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ignorant voters are unlikely to recognize all the relevant costs, particularly the more indirect and remote they are.

Further, the cost to opponents of constructing logically reasoned point-by-point refutations of such lists is astronomical, and the cost of getting rationally ignorant voters to pay attention is even higher. This is what ensures that a balanced rebuttal to false and misleading claims will tend to be either nonexistent or ineffective at reaching voters, which in turns makes deceptive political advertising successful and leads to an overlarge government.[13]

Because of the pervasive effect of political false advertising on behalf of government "solutions" and the voter gullibility, born of ignorance and wishful thinking, that is its source, any attempt to restrain the presence of government in the lives of citizens must include a consideration of some of the logical fallacies committed by its salesforce. Only as citizens become aware of these misleading propaganda techniques will they be able to constrain government to where each of its programs and policies can be justified on its true merits. Given how much of what government does cannot be so justified,[14] this could drastically reduce the size of government back towards its legitimate, limited role. Consider some of these false claims.

One of the most common false claims for government solutions is that government spending creates jobs (and thus also saves on welfare benefits). This is a half-truth that arises from considering just one side of the issue. Government *spending* does create jobs where those dollars are spent. However, this is not an argument for any particular government program, because those same dollars spent elsewhere would also create jobs. This means that choosing between two government spending programs is a matter of moving jobs, not creating them.

[13] This is the exact opposite of Anthony Down's argument that voters will be more informed about the costs of government than the benefits. Those who really stand to benefit from a government policy are rationally well informed of that fact, while others are misled by political "advertising," and the costs are dispersed among the general uninformed public, each of whom finds it too costly to do anything about it.

[14] See Dwight Lee and Richard McKenzie, *Regulating Government: The Positive Sum Solution* (Washington, D.C., Lexington Books, 1987) and Dwight Lee, "The Political Economy of the U.S. Constitution," *The Freeman* 37(2):59-69 (February 1987).

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Even more significantly, this argument does not favor government spending at all, because that spending requires taxes (or deficits, which represent deferred taxes; or inflation, which is just a particular form of taxation), and those taxes destroy jobs. Further, given the inefficiencies of the tax-transfer mechanism, the net effect is reduce the number of jobs available and effectively destroy resources in the process. So, what is presented as an argument to justify government spending is actually only convincing if one supports moving jobs from where mutually beneficial market choices dictate to where politicians dictate, the net destruction of jobs and resources, and arbitrary redistributions of wealth. While this may appeal to politicians and special interest groups, it does not appeal to voters once they become aware of the true nature of these effects.

Another misleading advertisement of the government is the claim that government spending creates multiplier effects, generating several dollars of total social benefits for each dollar spent. This is another half-truth. It is true that the added income resulting from government spending generates added spending and hence jobs and still more income, etc. However, this claim suffers from the same flaw as the job creation argument: any government spending would create such multiplier effects, but eliminating the taxes required to finance it would "create" even larger multiplier effects (by again avoiding the losses and inefficiencies inherent in such government intervention). Therefore, the multiplier effect argument, which is no more than counting multiplied effects of government spending while ignoring the even greater negative multiplied effects that would have resulted from leaving those funds in the private sector, is also false.

Some of the more creative forms of promoting the government "cure" are the various innovative ways of counting the same benefit in different disguises as if it was several different benefits, all of which are separately included. For instance, jobs and income will be treated as separate benefits, even though the jobs are actually the cost or effort required to receive the income. Similarly, crime reduction, increased crop yields, improved recreational opportunities or better views, and the resulting increased property values that go with them, will get counted

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separately, even though the property value increase is simply capitalizing the present value of the anticipated lower costs or increased benefits, resulting in overcounting.[15] These are all just additional, misleading ways of overstating the benefits of government spending (ways which wouldn't withstand the scrutiny applied by either competitors or customers to private sector advertising claims), leading to an engorged public sector.

Yet another form of false public advertising is counting what are really transfers from one group to another as net benefits. For example, a publicly provided recreational area may raise the prices and therefore profits on boat rentals, which get counted as benefits. However, these higher profits are not net benefits at all, because they are exactly offset by the higher costs to those who rent the boats (in addition, public provision of such services lowers the wealth of providers of private substitutes, but such losses are typically ignored).

The "external benefits" slogan will also be misapplied. This involves misleading claims that certain types of spending create external benefits to society, beyond those to the recipient, "justifying" government support in those areas. These false claims usually take one of three forms.

One such false claim is counting as external benefits effects that are in fact virtually all captured by the program recipient in the form of higher incomes (e.g., law, medical or dental school or any other productivity increasing training). Such effects do not provide external benefits, as providers must be compensated for the added services they now command.

The second such claim is counting what economists call inframarginal external benefits (benefits to society that may have been generated by lower levels spending, but which do not exist for expansions beyond the current level of expenditures) as if they would be benefits of additional spending. For instance, the value to the community of increasing literacy rates from five to ten

[15] Other examples of double counting can be found in Alan Prest and Ralph Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," *Surveys in Economic Theory*, Volume 3:155-207 (New York, St. Martins, 1966).

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percent by more education may have been great, but this does not imply that similar external benefits exist for increases from ninety to ninety five percent.

The third such claim is improper generalization, which involves focusing on one particular area of spending that may have external benefits (e.g., medical research) to argue that the whole general area of spending is supported by this argument (e.g., all government spending in health related fields).

All of the above arguments are false supports for government involvement. Even worse, however, is the fact that these erroneous arguments are often compounded by using them to argue that not only must government finance these services, it must provide them directly (e.g., public education and health care), a clear non sequitur. Even if government financing of a service is utilized, that in no way implies government provision is superior (e.g., the demonstrated efficiencies achieved through privatization and contracting out).

Still more misleading advertisements for government policies must be added to our far from exhaustive list. Included would be such things as plausible sounding claimed benefits whose magnitudes turn out to be insignificant (e.g., the claim that the food stamp program substantially benefits farmers[16]), or even have effects counter to those claimed (e.g., the claim that low income housing subsidies necessarily lead to more and better housing for the poor[17]), as well as distorted but plausible sounding statements (e.g., the claim that minimum wages help the poor[18]).

One more major category of false advertising that is often overlooked, because it takes a different form than overstating government program benefits, is that of substantially underestimating the costs of those programs to society. It is the error of treating each dollar of government spending as costing society only a dollar, so that alleged benefits can be compared to cash outlays

[16] See Browning and Browning, op. cit., p. 146.

[17] See David Hyman, *Public Finance*, 4th edition (New York, Dryden, 1993), pp. 247-251.

[18] See, for example, John Goodman and Edwin Dolan, *Economics of Public Policy*, 5th edition (New York, West, 1995).

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alone in evaluating programs, when in fact those resources cost society far more that the amounts spent.

A substantial part of the expenditures (sometimes over ten percent) as well as the taxes to finance them, go to administrative costs rather than generating benefits. The compliance costs on the part of both taxpayers and the program beneficiaries must also be included as relevant and sometimes substantial costs of any such government tax and spend scheme. The same is true of the distorting effects of tax financing on the allocation of resources, which occurs every time someone alters his choices because tax considerations reduce the value of his otherwise preferred (highest valued) alternative, although this distortion is usually "hidden" by general fund financing (not specifying which tax finances which expenditures). Finally, we must also add the costs of dynamic uncertainty due to the risk that the government will change the tax or regulatory rules in the future (always promoted as "reform," regardless of actual effects), which can turn a good decision into a bad one after the fact, and the lobbying costs of trying to defend against potential future adverse changes. Since the true social cost of a dollar of a government spending thus far exceeds a dollar, treating that spending as if it only costs a dollar results in far more government than citizens would support if they were aware of more of those costs (the exact opposite of Anthony Downs argument).

Conclusions

All of the above are examples of misleading arguments or advertising that lead to an overlarge governments. They work because: (1) government solution salesmen are not constrained to tell the truth; (2) relatively ignorant voters rely largely on the unsought "free" information provided to them, and evaluate their arguments less carefully than they would private market claims, making many inaccurate claims sound plausible; and (3) the cost to government promoters of their advertising is artificially cheap (given free by the media or paid by the taxpayers). Taken together, they form a highly persuasive case that rather than any lack of advertising about the benefits of government programs leading to it being too small, the ability of the government to promote its

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solutions with large amounts of effective, misleading advertising at low cost leads it to be too large. As a result, rather than being a force to offset the tendency of government to grow too large by engaging in wealth redistribution, false advertising makes the problem worse by providing an effective mechanism for justifying such wealth redistribution to the public.

Hopefully, following Hazlitt, continuing to expose the fallacies used to support government programs will help rein them in. If the government had to justify each program on its true merits, rather than on the basis of a misleading "shopping list" of alleged but not logically or empirically demonstrated benefits, there would be little of it left. Such a change would move us back toward the very limited government envisioned in the U.S. Constitution, devoted to the protection of private property and the right to voluntary exchange.

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National Competitiveness and Purchasing Power Parity

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Governments are perennially concerned over whether their countries' products are internationally competitive. But how should competitiveness be assessed? Indicators based on the concept of purchasing power parity are useful benchmarks but cannot account for structural developments that cause long-term shifts in equilibrium real exchange rates.

An important determinant of a country's external payments position is its international competitiveness. The most common approach to the analysis of competitiveness involves a comparison of movements in exchange rates and prices, based on the concept of purchasing power parity (PPP). This approach predicts that real exchange rates should tend to return to a constant long-run equilibrium in response to short-run shocks and, therefore, that nominal exchange rate movements should tend to offset relative price movements.

Empirical evidence suggests that PPP-based indicators may be useful to explain long-run movements in exchange rates among industrial countries, but less so to explain movements of these exchange rates in the short run, or of exchange rates between industrial and developing countries, either in the long or the short run. Examining changes in competitiveness alone is also not very helpful in explaining developments in external trade. It is necessary to incorporate the analysis of competitiveness in a broader framework – taking into account structural and cyclical economic developments, government policies, and financial market conditions – that may explain long-lasting changes in equilibrium real exchange rates.

What is Purchasing Power Parity?

Three versions of PPP have traditionally been used in the literature: the *law of one price*, which relates exchange rates to

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prices of individual homogeneous goods in different countries; *absolute PPP* which relates exchange rates to overall price levels; and *relative PPP* which relate exchange rate changes to inflation rates.

The *law of one price* states that when there are no transaction costs or trade barriers (such as tariffs or quotas), the prices of identical goods sold in different countries should be the same when expressed in a common currency. Empirically, the law of one price appears to hold well for homogeneous primary commodities traded on major exchanges, when adjustments are made for contract differences and delivery lags. Not surprisingly, however, the prices of differentiated products, such as manufactured goods and services,tend to deviate to a greater degree from the law of one price.

Absolute PPP extends the law of one price to the general price level. Absolute PPP predicts that the same basket of goods and services should cost the same amount in all countries when expressed in a common currency. Clearly, if the law of one price holds for every good, then absolute PPP should also hold. Absolute PPP, however, requires the parity relationship to hold only on *average* for all goods – not strictly for each good.

Absolute PPP provides a specific equilibrium concept for the nominal exchange rate, namely, the PPP exchange rate. This is defined as the rate that equalizes the prices of a common basket of goods in two different countries. Deviations between the market exchange rate and the PPP exchange rate are viewed as short--lived, as they should be eliminated by arbitragers purchasing goods in one country and selling them in another.

Despite their intuitive appeal, the empirical usefulness of the law of one price and of absolute PPP is limited. Transportation and information costs and institutional impediments to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, may limit consumers' and firms' responses to cross- country price differences, thus preventing absolute price levels from being equalized internationally. *Relative PPP* is a yet weaker condition than absolute PPP and predicts only that changes in nominal exchange rates should equal the difference between domestic and foreign inflation on equivalent baskets of goods. If PPP is judged to hold in some particular year, one can

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obtain, from a time series of the inflation differential, the implied PPP nominal exchange rate, which can then be compared with the market exchange rate.

Deviations from Parity

Most economic theories suggest that PPP should hold in the long run for traded goods, assuming that measurement problems involved in constructing comparable price deflators can be resolved. Empirical evidence on the validity of PPP is mixed, however (see the article by R. MacDonald for a survey of this evidence). On the one hand, there is a growing amount of evidence suggesting that PPP represents a reasonable characterization of long-run movements in industrial countries' exchange rates and traded goods' prices. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that PPP does not explain well the behavior of industrial country's exchange rates in the short run. Furthermore, when exchange rates and price movements are compared between industrial and developing countries – either the long run or the short run – PPP is clearly rejected, as large differences between inflation differentials and bilateral exchange rate changes persist in most cases over long horizons.

Research on exchange rates has considered four main reasons for deviations of real exchange rates from their PPP value: "hysteresis" effects due to adjustment costs; nominal price rigidities; imperfectly substitutable traded goods; and structural changes in technology and demand, particularly between traded and nontraded goods and services. The first two factors explain why PPP can fail over short horizons, while the last two can cause persistent failure of PPP.

"*Hysteresis*" *models of trade* attribute temporary deviations from PPP to the presence of adjustment costs in trade. These costs, which include the marketing of new products abroad, expanding or reducing production or distribution lines, and altering brand recognition, imply that trade flows need not respond to small changes in real exchange rates, as only large departures from PPP would trigger exporters' response,

Sticky price models of exchange rates recognize the different speed of adjustment between financial markets and goods markets:

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the former respond swiftly to exogenous shocks, while the latter adjust more slowly. As a result, unanticipated changes in monetary conditions may cause nominal exchange rates to deviate temporarily from their long-run PPP equilibrium.

A third factor generating departures from PPP is the *imperfect substitutability among different countries' traded goods*, which allows exporters to adjust prices to local market conditions, failing to offset changes in exchange rates by corresponding price changes. In this situation, cross-country differences in growth rates and in the response of trade to income growth can cause persistent changes in real exchange rates, and hence long-lasting deviations from PPP.

Finally, but perhaps most important, *differential rates of technical change in the traded and nontraded sectors* have long been recognized as a cause of sustained movements in equilibrium real exchange rates and, therefore, as a reason for the persistent failure of PPP. This is because, while market competition may keep prices of tradables broadly aligned internationally, prices of nontradables need not move together in different countries. Thus, if the real exchange rate between two countries is computed using price deflators that include both tradable and nontradable goods (such as the consumer price index (CPI) or the GDP deflator), then countries with faster growth of productivity in the traded sector (notably manufacturing) than in the nontraded sector (notably services), will exhibit a tendency toward real appreciation.

This phenomenon (the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect) is often advanced as an important factor underlying the long-term appreciation of industrial countries' real exchange rates relative to developing countries, but also as explaining movements in equilibrium real exchange rates among industrial countries. Japan, for instance, is often cited as the classic case of a country where faster growth of productivity in the traded vs. nontraded goods sectors relative to its trading partners has caused a real appreciation of its currency.

In summary, while it is useful to think of "competitiveness" as the relative position of a country's exchange rate: with respect to its long-run equilibrium value, it is not always easy to distinguish empirically between a change in the real exchange rate that

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reflects a change in competitiveness or a structural change that leads to a persistent change in the equilibrium real exchange rate. Indeed, it is misleading to regard every real depreciation as an improvement in a country's competitiveness, as this may reflect a simultaneous decline in both the current real exchange rate and its long-run equilibrium value. If, for example, world demand for a particular primary commodity declines, the price of this commodity will fall. Both the long-term equilibrium and the current value of the real exchange rate of a country specializing in the production of that commodity will then depreciate. Clearly, however, this' country will not be able to sell its products with any greater ease at the lower exchange rate.

This difficulty of assessing the dynamics of equilibrium real exchange rates, combined with statistical problems such as constructing qualitatively homogeneous baskets of goods and services, is central to any analysis of competitiveness. Furthermore, temporary deviations of current exchange rates from their medium- or long-run equilibria do not necessarily call for policy intervention, for they do not necessarily reflect a market failure. As noted above, real exchange rate fluctuations may well reflect optimal market responses to a variety of exogenous shocks.

Assessing Competitiveness

Owing to the difficulty involved in measuring changes in international competitiveness, economists and policymakers rely on a variety of indicators to provide a broad assessment – however imprecise – of developments in real exchange rates that may affect a country's ability to trade in world markets. These indicators differ primarily in their use of different price indices to deflate nominal exchange rates. For instance, a real exchange rate index based on the price of tradable goods is defined as the ratio of a weighted average of the home country's prices of exported goods to a weighted average of its partner countries' prices of exported goods, all expressed in the same currency. A rise in this indicator is viewed as signaling an increase in a country's export prices above their "world" level, and hence a loss of competitiveness for the home country in its export markets.

The main practical shortcoming of an export-based index of

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competitiveness is that it does not include all potentially exportable goods, but only those that are priced sufficiently low – *at the current exchange rate* – to be exported. Furthermore, if traded goods are close substitutes, then an export-based real exchange rate is likely to show little variation, as exporters will adjust price quickly in respond to exchange rate changes-even though operating profits may vary as a result. This has indeed been the case in Japan. If exporters "price to market" by altering profit margins in the short run, an export-based index of competitiveness would provide little information on the long-term profitability of domestic producers relative to their foreign counterparts.

More comprehensive measures of price competitiveness can be constructed on the basis of either aggregate price deflators or of unit labor costs. A GDP-based real exchange rate, for instance, would reflect the ratio of the relative prices of nontraded to traded goods at home and abroad, so that a rise in this index would indicate either a loss of competitiveness in the traded goods market, or a greater incentive to allocate resources to the nontraded goods sector at home. In addition to GDP - deflators, other broad indicators of competitiveness involve wholesale price indices, value-added deflators, and CPIs. Wholesale and value--added measures tend to be very imprecise, lack cross-country comparability, and are typically available only for the manufacturing sector, often with a substantial delay. CPIs are available on a more timely basis and with greater frequency, but reflect taxes and other institutional distortions, as well as prices of imported goods, thus making the associated measures of competitiveness less indicative of the price faced by producers.

A real exchange rate index defined in terms of relative unit labor costs (ULCs) in the traded goods sector typically compare the profitability of nonlabor factors in producing manufactured goods at home and abroad. Implicit in this measure is the notion that exchange rates operate to equilibrate the rate of return to nonlabor factors of production across countries. ULC-based indicators have the advantage of being defined rather similarly across countries, although an unduly restrictive focus on the manufacturing sector is typically required to assure this homogeneity. Furthermore, because they are defined in terms of unit (or

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average) labor costs, they provide only a rough approximation of the relative incentives for labor allocation at home and abroad, which should be measured by *marginal* labor costs. Although the relationship between marginal and average labor costs varies with capital/output ratios, changes in unit labor costs may reflect only changes in capital/output that are unrelated to competitiveness. Nonlabor costs also include costs other than the remuneration to capital, such as the rental of land and the cost of intermediate goods and primary commodities. In principle, labor cost indices could be corrected for the share of value added domestically, but this correction is difficult to carry out in practice. ULC-based indicators also tend to become available with delay and are often subject to large measurement errors.

Recent Experience

How useful are the competitiveness indicators discussed above as predictors of exchange rate pressure and changes in trade volumes? A study by P. Turner and J. Van't dack (1993) cautiously suggests that standard indicators of competitiveness provide a useful picture of trends in exchange rates, prices, and productivity in the main industrial countries. L. Lipschitz and D. McDonald studied the evolution of Germany's competitiveness during the 1980s vis-à-vis its European partners and showed that the ability of ULC-based real exchange rates to predict changes in European trade shares could be enhanced by adjusting this indicator to account for movements of value-added deflators. This study also suggested that the inability of standard GDP-based and CPI-based indicators of competitiveness to predict the pattern of market shares during this period could be explained by the slower rate of productivity growth in Germany's traded goods sector vis-à-vis its partners. I. Marsh and S. Tokarick compared the ability of several competitiveness indicators to predict trade flows. They found evidence of a long-run response of trade to competitiveness, but little evidence of such linkage in the short run. None of the indicators examined seemed to uniformly outperform the others in terms of predictive power.

Some recent studies have also tried, with some success, to link market-based expectations of exchange rate changes to

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macroeconomic "fundamentals," including competitiveness. F. Caramazza, for example, found that investors' anticipations of a realignment of the French/German exchange rate mechanism (ERM) parity from 1987 to 1991 could be explained in large part by variables such as inflation rates and export competitiveness. L. Bartolini found similar results for Ireland, while A. Rose and L.E.O. Svensson reached more mixed conclusions.

Conclusion

A country's competitiveness reflects variety of factors that affect relative profit opportunities in the tradables and non-tradable sectors, including structural are cyclical developments in productivity and demand, and financial market condition Competitiveness indicators *alone* are unlikely to adequately account for these macroeconomic "fundamentals," which are likely to affect the intertemporal dynamics of trade flows no less than exchange rates do. In fact, these "fundamentals" are likely to lead to long-lasting changes in equilibrium real exchange rates, and hence may underlie the observed long-term trends in the competitiveness indicators themselves. Changes in competitiveness generate economic forces that move real exchange rates toward their long-term equilibrium, but a more comprehensive framework is needed to explain changes in the equilibrium rates themselves.

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BOOK REVIEW ARTICLE

Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
Robert P. Newman
Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1995
Hardback, 272 pages
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Hiroshima in Historical Context

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Even though the crest of the recent flood of discussion marking the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has passed, the argument over the bombing can be expected to continue indefinitely. In the context of this debate, it remains valuable to discuss the issues raised by one of the leading books on that subject that appeared during the anniversary year of 1995.

We will then broaden our discussion to include two important aspects of historical context suggested by the book. One of these relates to the twentieth century's degeneration into "total war," as discussed by Frederick J. P. Veale in his *Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima*.[1] The atomic bombing of cities marked the culmination of a process by which civilization had become increasingly removed from the "Rules of Civilized Warfare" that developed in Europe in the seventeenth century. So vast had become the attacks on civilian populations by the end of World War II that the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was, despite the spectacular nature of devastation wrought by single bombs, in fact no worse than that suffered by Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne and other cities subjected to massed air attack. It isn't fully appropriate for the world to discuss Hiroshima and

[1] Frederick J. P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima* (New York: Devin Adair, 1968); first published in London in 1948.

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Nagasaki without seeing them in that context.

The second aspect suggested by Newman's book – one which calls for attention because it has been so greatly neglected – is the geo-political-ideological context of the decision to use nuclear weapons. As we will see, Newman's defense of Truman's decision is written – and this will be surprising to many, especially among American conservatives – from a perspective of what would today be called "the Old Left." Newman's discussion accordingly raises long-dormant issues relating to what the United States' strategy in Asia ought to have been as the war with Japan reached its conclusion. There were those who at the time proposed a very different strategy than that favored by pro-Mao "China expert" Owen Lattimore and adopted by President Harry S. Truman. These were people who believed that the future protection of Asia from Communism must be part of American strategy as to how the United States was to conclude the war. There can be little doubt but that the history of the postwar era would have been vastly different if their advice had been followed.

This second aspect has several dimensions. First, in Europe as well as in Asia the United States fought World War II without attempting to minimize the position occupied by Stalin at the end of the war – and even went out of its way to increase that position. With this in mind, the decisions in Asia take their place as part of a much larger question of geo-politics *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union.

Second, the United States' actions on this larger issue were to a major extent the product of ideological skewing. Stalin had long-since shown himself a colossal butcher, but American "idealism," blinded by factors that included the overbearing influence of the leftist intellectual culture's pro-Soviet ideology, was unable to see that. American strategy would have been far different if it had done so.

Third, the immediately preceding point leads to the more general observation that much of the history of international affairs in the twentieth century has been the product of ideological skewing, not simply with regard to the United States' perception of Communism but as to several issues of major importance. Here, as before, a more complete understanding requires the broadest possible context.

Subject to the reservations that will be expressed, Robert Newman's *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* is a welcome addition to

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a literature that contains, as it is bound to, both bitter argument and deep reflection. Newman provides a summary of the debate about the use of the bombs, recounting the arguments made by the critics of the bombing and supplying with both cogency and passion a rebuttal to each. However, his analysis isn't neutral.

Most Americans have strongly supported the United States' use of the bombs. A friend of the reviewer's who fought in the tank corps entering Germany thanks their use for having saved him from transfer to the Far East to take part in the invasion of Japan, where he believes he would probably have been killed. (Admiral Leahy argued that an invasion was unnecessary because the blockade had already effectively defeated Japan;[2] but an invasion was planned nevertheless.) But for those who have shared this perspective, especially American conservatives, there is a surprise in store about Newman's book. He agrees with them on the specific issue of whether the bombs should have been dropped, but is otherwise quite contemptuous of them and of what he supposes to be their reasons for supporting President Truman's decision. He speaks of "right-wing Japanophobes motivated primarily by racism." (He defends Truman from the charge of racism, but he is quite ready to put it onto American conservatives, reflecting the leftist bias that is ready to see sordid motivations in literally everything that the former do or think.) Looking back to the end of World War II, he lumps highly respected Sen. Richard Russell, Rep. Roy O. Woodruff, and the *Chicago Tribune* into this category.[3] This explains, parenthetically, why he expresses agreement with Japan's original anti-"western colonialism" objective; Newman is not really pro-western.

The fact is that Newman is a person of the Left, and that his book represents a split within the Left over Hiroshima. There are many on the Left who delight in "blaming America" at every opportunity, and accordingly join enthusiastically in the denunciations of Hiroshima. Newman, on the other hand, is an admirer and biographer of Owen Lattimore, the "expert on China" who among intellectu-

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[2] Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), pp. 156-57; Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 82.

[3] Newman, *Cult*, p. 64.

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als was perhaps most responsible for the Roosevelt-Truman policies that undercut Chiang Kai-shek and led to the subjugation of China to the butcheries of the Communist regime that holds power to this day. Newman is author of *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China*.[4] In that book, Newman tells how Lattimore was concerned that the Truman administration might follow the advice of a group that Lattimore and Newman join in labelling "the Japanophiles." It was a group which felt that a defeated Japan might remain a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia.[5] In an article in the September 1995 issue of *Commentary*, Donald Kagan quotes Gerhard Weinberg to the effect that "'the articulate organizations of the American Left' [in 1945] resisted any concessions and 'urged the dropping of additional bombs instead.'" Lattimore and Newman can best be understood as part of that orientation. Ironically, it places Newman today in independent and somewhat courageous opposition to "politically correct" verities, which condemn the bombings.

What we have seen about the 1945 Left's position is worth pondering. Lattimore welcomed Stalin's entry into the war and resulting hegemony over Manchuria, which led within four short years to military disaster for Chiang Kai-shek; he opposed American strategists who wanted to maintain enough Japanese presence to prevent a Communist conquest of Asia;[6] he supported the demand for unconditional surrender, thinking it necessary for a reconstruction of Japanese society; and he welcomed the use of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Newman agrees, and it is in that context that he developed his outlook that supports President Truman's decisions to use the bombs. Thus, he arrives at that support from a diametrically opposite direction than do the conservatives whom he excoriates as "racist" and as "fanatically anti-Communist."[7]

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[4] Robert P. Newman, *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[5] Newman, *Lattimore*, p. 138; Newman, *Cult*, p. 65.

[6] Newman, *Cult*, p. 64.

[7] Newman, *Cult*, p. 64; Newman, *Lattimore*, p. 135.

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Total War

Something that is often overlooked is that the inquiry should treat Hiroshima and Nagasaki as part of a much larger phenomenon: that of total war, conducted unreservedly and without limited objectives against the enemy's civilian population. This is discussed with great profundity in F. J. P. Veale's 1948 book *Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima*. To see that context, we will need to recall the history Veale recounted.

Before the seventeenth century. Throughout most of history, Veale says, the brutality of warfare has seen few limits. Veale supplies several of what could be endless examples of its ferocity. "In prehistoric warfare all prisoners were killed as a matter of course." He speaks of "the indiscriminate massacring of women and children – even young babies – which was so common among many ancient oriental peoples." The Empire of Assyria, in the fifth through seventh centuries A.D., he says, was "a state which existed mainly by warfare for warfare," revolutionizing methods and utilizing specialists of many kinds. "We find the Assyrians proudly erecting pyramids of skulls"; and it was routine to deport a defeated people *en masse*.[8]

The Byzantine Empire's Basil the Bulgar-Slayer "made it a practice in his campaigns with the Bulgarians to put out the eyes of his prisoners, on one occasion to the number of 15,000." And in the Albigensian Crusade of 1209 "to root out heresy in southern France...a contemporary estimate puts the total number of those who perished at 500,000." It was just a few years later that Genghis Kahn conducted his Mongol campaign across eastern Europe, in which his soldiers sorted out the skilled craftsmen and attractive women from a captured population and beheaded all the rest.[9]

A turning point came with the horrors of the Thirty Years War in seventeenth century Europe in which "it is generally agreed that ... one-third of the population of Central Europe perished," amounting to fifteen million people (an incredible number at any time, but especially so in light of the much smaller population compared to today's). In simply the one massacre at Magdeburg in 1631, "some

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[8] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 51, 64, 58, 61, 64, 66.

[9] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 72, 79.

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25,000 people were butchered." Although Veale cites evidence to cast doubt upon the notion that the Thirty Years War was truly a war of religion, he says that the war did give rise to a consensus among Europeans that "the belief of each individual concerning the eternal truths upon which his or her salvation depended should be decided by the predilections or whims of the prince whose subject he or she should happen to be." This involved "the tacit conclusion that, thenceforth, religious differences must never again serve as a reason for civil war."[10]

Development of the European "Rules of Civilized Warfare." The consensus just mentioned arose in the middle of the seventeenth century and in 1758 was articulated by the Swiss jurist Emeric de Vattel in his book *The Law of Nations.* War was to be for limited objectives and carried on between armies of professional soldiers. The consensus' elements were to limit hostilities to the uniformed forces of an enemy; not to attack civilians, destroy towns or ravage the countryside; and to respect prisoners. It was, however, all right to kill hostages as reprisal (a principle that continued to be recognized by British and American military regulations during World War II).[11]

This was by no means a move by the world generally to the concept of limited war. Veale says it was "never practised outside Europe or in countries not under European influence." Britain, as an island nation that depended largely on a projection of power through its navy, did not agree to limit the bombardment of coastal towns. Nor did the Europeans apply the limitations to non-Europeans, as Veale illustrates with some telling examples. In the United States, the Revolutionary War was conducted according to the rules; but no such restraint was shown in either the Civil War or during the three centuries of indian wars.[12]

The almost two-century span during which this consensus prevailed was history's most successful limitation of warfare, but there have been some limits in other times and places. Both Homer's *Iliad*

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[10] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 72, 73, 82.

[11] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 14, 107, 87, 88, 94, 96.

[12] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 73, 88, 117, 99, 120, 121-26.

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and Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* show some restraint in ancient times, such as the calling of a truce to allow forces to recover the bodies of their dead. Veale says that in fifteenth century Italy there was a brief period during which princes hired mercenaries who fought wars among themselves and were dispersed when the war was over.[13]

The eventual move away from the consensus. Conditions soon began to change dramatically from those that had made the European consensus possible. The Peoples' Wars in Europe that followed the French Revolution involved large armies of conscripted civilians, mass killings and disease, and the propagandistic manipulation of populations with moralistic black-versus-white messages to induce hate for the enemy. Populations grew enormously and nations became industrial giants; advanced weapons and giant armies sprang from that industrial prowess; and the growth of democracy involved the increased power of the press and the need to cast conflict within a superficial moral context, with its attendant poses.[14]

World War I, produced by a "pathological wave of hysteria," resulted from these factors. Nevertheless, according to Veale, it was mainly fought within the rules. (There was one major exception: the British blockade of Germany "which was continued for nearly a year after the Armistice and led to the starvation of nearly a million German non-combatants," a fact confirmed by a British White Paper, which estimated 800,000.)[15] If the war had ended with the stalemate of 1917, Europe might have maintained something of the earlier consensus (although the structural changes in modern life that I just mentioned had taken away its basis), as well as have enjoyed a peace that was tolerable to the opposing sides. As it was, American

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[13] See Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1954), p. 286, where he says that under Hellenic law "it was a rule established everywhere that an invader of another country should keep his hands off the temples that were in that country." At pp. 287 and 353 he tells of the "established custom" for the sides in a conflict to call a truce to "allow them to recover their dead." This is consistent with what we are told in Homer's *Iliad*, where the war with Troy is suspended for eleven days to allow for the burial of Hector.

[14] Veale, *Barbarism*, p. 94.

[15] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 111-13, 133, 140.

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intervention continued the war to November 1918, resulting in the victory of the allies and the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty "imposed harsh dictated peace terms upon the vanquished, thereby inevitably arousing in them a determination to reverse its decisions." Adolf Hitler "was the incarnation of this determination," and World War II in Europe is best understood as a continuation of the first war.[16]

It was World War II, Veale says, that saw the near-total breakdown of the Rules of Civilized Warfare.[17] The idea of terror bombing was much debated between the wars. In *Ethics and Airpower in World War II*, Stephen Garrett tells how the idea was put forth by "the famous Italian airpower theorist, General Giulio Douhet," who argued that "a complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to ... merciless pounding from the air."[18] The German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz had written that "war is an act of force which theoretically can have no limits."[19] British Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard recommended the construction of long-range bombers for attacks on an enemy civilian population. By the time the war started, Britain was prepared to project airpower in much the same way it had traditionally used seapower to take a war to the enemy, but Germany was not.

From September 3, 1939 to May 11, 1940 in the air war between Germany and Britain, the attacks by both were limited to purely military targets. At the end of this period, however, Britain bombed railway installations in western Germany, and on May 15-16 bombed the Ruhr. These attacks involved a much-broadened definition of "military objectives" that included industrial areas. Four months later, Hitler began bombing British industrial targets, and this led to the German bombing of Coventry on November 14, 1940, a bombing that in the manner it was conducted was essentially

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[16] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 13, 155.

[17] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 152, 157, 158.

[18] Veale, *Barbarism*, p. 112.

[19] Stephen A. Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 6.

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consistent with that sort of target. The British conducted a massed air attack on Mannheim on December 16 that again was consistent with the escalation to targets of this sort.[20]

Veale tells us that a final major escalation occurred on March 30, 1942 when the British War Cabinet approved the Lindemann plan to focus bombing *on "working-class houses in densely populated residential areas."* The plan ratified an escalation that the British had already been carrying out for some time.[21] In addition to the destruction of cities, the British intent was to destroy crops, start forest fires, and kill refugees.[22] As the war went on, there was a systematic destruction of German cities, including (but by no means limited to) the following: Lübeck, the first German city to be destroyed, was set on fire on March 28-29, 1942. On May 30, almost 900 planes dropped 1455 tons of bombs, two-thirds of them incendiaries, on Cologne, destroying 600 acres there. The firestorm technique, in which high-explosive bombs and land mines were used to blow off rooftops and were followed by incendiary bombs that created a tornadic storm of heat and flame that sucked in people and even uprooted trees, was used against Hamburg in July and August 1943, resulting in 50,000 dead. Starting in November 1943, 6340 acres of Berlin were destroyed by what was largely indiscriminate bombing, with the air crews rarely able to see the city through the clouds. Dresden was left untouched until the "Schrekensnacht" of February 13, 1945 when the city, filled with refugees from the onrushing Red Army, was bombed by 800 aircraft, producing another gigantic firestorm, with casualities estimated at 250,000 by some authorities.[23]

For its part in Europe, the United States limited itself mainly to precision bombing of selected targets until the last year of the war,

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[20] Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, p. 132.

[21] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 30, 168-84; for a chronology of the air war, see Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, pp. 10-21.

[22] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 184-85, 18-19, 112.

[23] As to crops and forests, see Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), Vol. IV, pp. 116-17. As to refugees, see Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, p. 83.

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but then participated in the general area attacks on German cities, including the firestorming of Dresden.[24] The bombing of civilian populations continued in the war against Japan (with respect to which which it is worth noting that the Japanese had been far from innocent in their treatment of civilian populations). Garrett speaks of "the American fire-bombing of Japanese cities, notably the March 9, 1945 raid on Tokyo (in which 300 B-29s destroyed over 16 square miles of the city), as well as the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." More than 100,000 people died in the Tokyo firebombing-[25]

This, then, was the context in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed. The use of the atomic bombs would hardly have been thinkable without this prelude of total war and complete devaluation of the lives of the enemy's population. What we have traced has merely been the history of massed bombing, which is most directly pertinent as a prelude to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Conceptual aspects of total war. The underlying factors had their mental, ideological side that reflected the new realities and the power of propaganda and of distorted moralism. Among these were:

- A total blackening of the opponent, who came to be viewed as the distillation of evil. (It would be appropriate to call this "the Darth Vader syndrome." Indeed, the Darth Vader character in the Star Wars series illustrates how deeply rooted this demonizing propensity is.)
- A resulting sense that to lose would be intolerable, so that anything whatsoever, no matter how extreme, must be done to avoid defeat.
- The premise, also, by each side that it must "do unto the enemy whatever it takes to win before the enemy does the same unto you."
- The abandonment of the distinction between "combatant"

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[24] Veale, *Barbarism*, pp. 62, 175, 185, 187; Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, pp. xii, 17, 15; Sir Arthur Harris, *Bomber Offensive* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), pp. 112, 174-75, 186-88, 242. See especially Webster and Frankland, *Strategic Air Offensive*, pp. 310-15, for a vivid description and technical analysis (from a scientific metereological standpoint) of the Hamburg firestorm.

[25] Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, p. xiii.

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and "non-combatant."

- A willingness to accept means, when used against the enemy, that would previously have been beyond consideration.

The post-World War II era. The "mutually assured destruction" entailed by the superpowers' possession of nuclear weapons during the Cold War was perhaps the major cause for World War III's not occurring despite the face-off between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, and for the reintroduction of "limited wars." Mass slaughter, however, has by no means been abandoned, but has become internalized, occurring within rather than between countries, as we saw under Mao with the Great Leap Forward, in Cambodia under Pol Pot, in Uganda under Idi Amin, in Rwanda on more than one occasion, and in other similar episodes. Clandestine terrorism has become a way to strike brutally without provoking a massive response; and conquest on quite a vast scale can be accomplished imperceptibly (and without anyone's conscious intention) by immigration rather than by armed invasion, as is seen today in the Third World's on-going recasting of Europe and America.

It has become a truism that the human race has developed modes of mass destruction before it is morally prepared to handle them. This dilemma in large measure amounts to the fact that the situation cries out for world government and a world "rule of law" at a point in human development when the cultural and civilizational prerequisites for them are so lacking that there is little reason for confidence in creating a massive centralized power. Given the context reviewed in the preceding paragraph, world government bodes just as likely to be a Leviathan of horror as a deliverer of peace, freedom and good order. Imagine a world government acting out the illusions of ideology and propaganda!

The lessons of the past show that it ill-behooves any people to become so militarily weak *vis-a-vis* a possible opponent (if they can possibly avoid it) that that opponent will feel free to use whatever means it likes. One would prefer to believe that there is a limit to what human beings are willing to do to each other, but it takes no more than a reading of the history just recounted or of the daily paper to show that that is not so.

The Role of Ideological-Intellectual Skewing

The preceding section placed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the

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broader context of total war in which they are best understood. The decision to use the bombs relates, however, to an equally significant dimension that virtually all of the discussion of President Truman's decisions overlooks. It is, as Hanson Baldwin made clear, that the United States fought World War II in Europe and the Pacific without long-term geo-political objectives reflecting a concern about the strengthened condition that Communism, another brutal totalitarian system, might find itself in at the end of the war. (It will become clear later how this relates to the dropping of the bombs.)

Although Baldwin blames this on American naivete and errors of perception,[26] it is more accurate to see the lack of concern as due primarily to a monstrous ideological skewing. The United States was profoundly affected by its intellectual culture's 1917-1947 enthusiasm for Soviet Russia's "Communist experiment."[27] The result was that Americans chose to fight to the death against the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini, seeing them as the epitome of evil, while allying themselves with yet another totalitarian power that had a far bloodier record. Having done so, they persuaded themselves that they were, to borrow a phrase made famous by President Truman, dealing with "good old Joe." So persuaded, they disregarded recommended strategies that would have seen to it that Communism came out of the war with the most minimal position possible.

Looking back to World War I, perhaps the most important factor leading to the United States' eventual participation in World War I was the American public's acceptance of atrocity propaganda, with the result that Germany came to be seen as an outlaw power, indeed an outlaw people. The sordid history of this propaganda was told in 1928 by Arthur Ponsonby, a member of the British parliament, in his book *Falsehood in Wartime*. In a barrage of false reports, German soldiers were said to cut the breasts off of nurses, to cut hands off children and eat them, to impale babies on bayonets and nail them to doors, and to boil down bodies for oil. The Germans also spread false reports, such as of the gouging of eyes, and the French were the most accomplished at manufacturing false photo-

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[26] Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, p. 9.

[27] See Dwight D. Murphey, *Liberalism in Contemporary America* (McLean, VA: Council for Social & Economic Studies, 1992), pp. 47-48, 60-66.

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graphic evidence; but it was the British propaganda that largely reached the American public.[28] So effective was this propaganda that the present author's mother, who was a young girl in the United States at the time, often told him in later years of nightmares she had had of German soldiers committing atrocities.

This demonizing of Germany created one of the most fateful preoccupations of the twentieth century, akin to the "Black Legend" that had earlier been for so long laid upon Spain. Thoroughly convinced by this demonization, my parents and grandparents would have been scandalized by the merest suggestion of what I am about to say. The image was of a Germany militaristic far beyond anything seen in other countries, and that threatened the very existence of democracy in the world. (World War I was accordingly declared "a war to make the world safe for democracy.") But it was France, with its Napoleonic tradition, that had by far the greater heritage of militarism; and it was Britain, with colonies throughout the world, that insisted on having a navy that was always equal to the two other largest navies in the world. It is significant that, as Veale tells us, "the Reich, after its foundation in 1871, preserved an unbroken peace with its neighbours until 1914, a period of forty-three years..."[29] Indeed, the Kaiser, despite his penchant for military dress, was known as "the prince of peace" because of his services as a mediator between disputing nations.[30] So far as the cauldron of illiberal thought was concerned, Julien Benda's famous book *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals* makes it clear that the rampant anti-Enlightenment opinion in the nineteenth century, with its illiberal theories of class and race struggle and the like, was as much, or perhaps more, a product of French as of German thinkers.[31]

The hindsight that is now possible shows that American

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[28] Veale, *Barbarism*, p. 68.

[29] Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), pp. 590, 595.

[30] Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), pp. 590, 595.

[31] Julien Benda, *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1930), pp. 81, 116, 119.

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intervention, resulting from propaganda and skewed ideology, had disastrous results. The warring powers were stalemated in early 1917, and this created, according to Veale, a "golden opportunity to establish a lasting settlement." The slaughter had been so great that "had peace been concluded in 1917, for several generations at least the militarists and armament manufacturers would have striven in vain to banish the memory of such an experience."[32] The historian A. J. P. Taylor says "the first World war would obviously have had a different end if it had not been for American intervention; the Allies, to put it bluntly, would not have won."[33]

What would have been the consequences if the United States had not come in and the stalemate had continued, producing victory for neither side?

- Almost certainly there would not have been a successful November Revolution in Russia bringing the Bolsheviks to power. The eventual reverberations of this can be traced into eastern Europe, Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba and countless other places throughout the world. Even the United States would have experienced a vastly different twentieth century history without many decades of confrontation with Communist expansionism.
- Germany would not have been caused to burn with the passion that led it into Nazism and from there into World War II. Taylor says that "Germany fought specifically in the second war to reverse the verdict of the first and to destroy the settlement which followed it."[34]
- World War II and its attendant horrors would not have occurred.
- Europe's decline as the center of world gravity, with all that that entails now and in the future, would either not have occurred or have been greatly slowed.

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[32] Veale, *Barbarism*, p. 152.

[33] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (Greenwich, CN: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1961), pp. viii, 36.

[34] Taylor, *Origins*, p. 23.

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Any such enumeration can do no more than hint at the differences, which extend incalculably. It isn't too much to say that American intervention into World War I was one of the single most pivotal events of the century. (This is not the same thing as putting the blame upon the United States for all that followed. While we can say that "*but for* the intervention, the things we have mentioned would not have occurred," the century's horrors had many other causes of a more proximate nature.)

As the world swept toward World War II:
the double-standard toward totalitarian systems.

The average American takes pride in seeing himself as "practical and not ideological." It will shock an American, therefore, to be told that ideology and propaganda played a commanding role in the United States' entry into World War I and then in guiding the United States during the two decades between the wars.

A double standard came into being toward the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, with the Nazi seen as pure evil and the Stalinist as neither evil nor dangerous. As a consequence, the United States was willing to go to war to defeat the first while allying itself with the second, something it would hardly have done if it had had a realistic understanding of Soviet Communism. Additionally, the United States fought that war in a way that did not attempt to minimize the position Soviet Communism would command at the end of the war. There would seem to be two major reasons for this double standard. One was that World War I had accustomed the American public to seeing the Germans in the worst possible light, so that the United States was predisposed toward the first half of the standard. The other was that the predominant American intellectual culture, in common with leftist intellectuality in Europe, was deeply infatuated with the "Soviet experiment" until at least 1947. As we look back, we must see it as one of the great intellectual crimes of history that this subculture was willing to ignore, and hence to fail to inform the world about, such things as Stalin's deliberate seizure of all food from the Ukraine and other areas during the winter of 1932-33, resulting in what historian Robert Conquest has estimated as the

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death *of some seven to nine million people*; or about the millions in concentration camps (the "gulags" that Solzhenitsyn was able to bring to the world's attention years later), in which Conquest says that eventually *an estimated twelve million people died*.[35]

Seven to nine *million*!

Twelve *million*!

Not figures on a page, but living, breathing human beings.

The intellectual culture said nothing about these (and still to this day says virtually nothing, erecting no museums and filming no television mini-series), although it did undergo serious shocks from Stalin's purges, which resulted in the execution of many of the old Bolsheviks whom American "liberals" had met on pilgrimages to Soviet Russia in the 1920s and early '30s. We are told the startling fact that of the 1966 delegates to the 17th Communist Party Congress held in January 1934, 1108 were shot in the purges.[36]

This double standard is built into the conventional understanding today, so that it seems natural for the United States to have fought with the Soviet Union against Germany. But there were some who did not hold to the double standard and for whom such a course did not seem natural. Those whom the world has since the late 1930s excoriated as "appeasers" of Hitler are said by A. J. P. Taylor to have had a fundamentally correct insight: they "feared that the defeat of Germany would be followed by a Russian domination over much of Europe. Later experience," he continues, "suggests that they were right... Only those who wanted Soviet Russia to take the place of Germany are entitled to condemn the 'appeasers.'"[37] Stephen Garrett tells us that Liddell

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[35] Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 710; Report to Congress, Commission on the Ukraine Famine, submitted to Congress on April 12, 1988, p. 63. See also Dwight D. Murphey, "Soviet Communism's Deliberate Murder of Millions," *Conservative Review*, October 1992, pp. 38-44.

[36] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror* (Middlesex, England: Penquin Books, 1968), p. 63.

[37] Taylor, *Origins*, pp. 291-92.

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Hart "viewed the effective elimination of Germany as a factor in the European power balance as something that would invite Soviet domination of the Continent once the war was ended."[38]

Perhaps foremost among those who understood this was former American president Herbert Hoover, who spoke out repeatedly. On October 26, 1938 he said, about "an alliance with dictatorial Russia," that "far from standing on the side of Liberty, we should be standing on the side of Communism. And Russia is certainly not a Democratic state."[39] On June 29, 1941, a week after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Hoover said about the United States' promise of aid to Stalin that collaboration with Russia "makes the whole argument of our joining the war to bring the four freedoms to mankind a gargantuan jest. We should refresh our memories a little. Four American Presidents and four Secretaries of State beginning with Woodrow Wilson refused to have anything to do with Soviet Russia...."[40] He, too, foresaw the postwar threat: "If we...join the war and we win, then we have won for Stalin the grip of Communism on Russia and more opportunity for it to extend in the world." He urged that the United States provide the Soviet Union only enough aid to enable it and Nazi Germany to fight each other to exhaustion.[41]

As it turned out, within a short five years after the end of World War II Communism stood in control of eastern Europe and of China, and had launched its attack on South Korea. In light of this, is there any justification for Americans, other than those on the Left, to hold to the perceptions they have so long taken for granted? It is time that thoughtful people, most particularly in the United States, reassess the understanding they have long had of

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[38] Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower*, p. 108.

[39] Herbert Hoover, *America's Way Forward* (New York: The Scribner Press, 1939), p. 32.

[40] Herbert Hoover, *Addresses Upon the American Road* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. 93.

[41] Hoover, *Addresses*, p. 95; Richard Norton Smith, *An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 312, 343.

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these things.

The failure to pursue an appropriate geo-political strategy during World War II to block postwar Communist expansion.

In his book *An Uncommon Man* about Herbert Hoover, Richard Norton Smith says that during the war Hoover saw that "Americans shouldn't deceive themselves into thinking of the Soviet Union as anything more than a temporary ally. Hearing of an Allied landing at Dieppe in August 1942, Hoover dismissed the idea of a second European front. It was, he stormed, nothing more than 'a bloody sacrifice to Stalin.'"[42] Hanson Baldwin seconds this, saying that if the United States had been realistic about the nature of Communism, knowing both of its butchery and its messianic impulse, "our wartime alliance with Russia would have been understood for what it clearly was: a temporary marriage of expediency."[43] The United States refused to pursue any strategy designed to get American and British forces to southern and central Europe ahead of the Red Army; and American forces were even held back in the closing weeks of the war, allowing the Red Army to take Berlin and Prague.

This was compounded almost immediately after the end of the war in Europe. U. S. diplomat Sumner Welles, who was undersecretary of state until his retirement in 1943, considers a "grave mistake" to have been the United States' "withdrawal in May, 1945, of the American forces that had liberated Czechoslovakia," to which Welles adds "our failure to insure unimpeded access to Berlin from the West." Welles says "it is now an open secret that Prime Minister Churchill repeatedly requested President Truman to agree to keep the American forces in Czechoslovakia and to keep the gates of Berlin open to the West until a meeting between the President, Stalin, and himself had taken place, and that his pleas met with an adamant refusal. President Truman's refusal was presumably dictated by his desire not to take any

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[42] Smith, *Uncommon Man*, p. 318.

[43] Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, p. 9.

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action that could arouse Moscow's suspicion of our objectives. On the other hand, the maneuvers of the Russian armies in Austria as well as in Germany had already caused us justifiable concern."[44]

In Asia, a maximizing of Stalin's position, with no provision for an effective postwar Japanese presence to serve as a counterweight.

A similar debate occurred about Asia during the war, with the issue being the position that Communism would find itself in when the war was over. As with Europe, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations accepted the policies of those who made anti-Communism no part of their thinking, and brushed aside the views of those who did.

Sumner Welles tells of "efforts of several of President Roosevelt's representatives in China to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to comply with the demands of the Chinese Communists...."[45] And former Secretary of War Stimson wrote that, quite to the contrary of desiring to keep the Red Army from occupying strategic positions north of China, "much of the policy of the United States toward Russia, from Teheran to Potsdam, was dominated by the eagerness of the Americans to secure a firm Russian commitment to enter the Pacific war."[46] This reached its culmination at the Yalta Conference in February 1945; Welles says "it was at Yalta that Roosevelt and Churchill conceded Stalin's Far Eastern demands covering the return of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to Russia, *and a position in Manchuria that was tantamount to full control of that ancient province*" [emphasis added].[47] Baldwin says "Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan within an estimated ninety days after the end of the war against Germany, but for it he got the Kurile Islands, all of Sakhalin, half-interest in the railways in Manchuria, Port Arthur,

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[44] Welles, *Seven Decisions*, pp. 202-203.

[45] Welles, *Seven Decisions*, p. 155.

[46] Quoted in Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, pp. 77-78.

[47] Welles, *Seven Decisions*, p. 138.

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a Russian-controlled 'free port' in Dairen, *and thus strategic hegemony in important northeast Asia*" [emphasis added].[48]

Ambassador Joseph C. Grew (one of those whom Robert Newman denigrates as a "Japanophile,"[49] a characterization that is quite misleading since Grew was in no sense an admirer of Japan's military regime) was among those who saw the implications. In a memorandum he made for his private use in mid-May 1945, he wrote that "once Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea will gradually slip into Russia's orbit...." He ended with the words "to be followed in due course by China" – a prediction, about a matter of the greatest possible significance, that events proved correct – "and eventually Japan," which fortunately was not.[50]

Herbert Hoover proposed to President Truman the details of a possible negotiated peace with Japan: it (a) would eliminate the need for an invasion of the home islands; (b) would maintain the strength of the American economy to allow it to aid other nations; (c) would shore up a non-Communist China; and (d) would block Soviet expansion. And, what is most directly pertinent to our review of Newman's book on Hiroshima, such a peace would have made unnecessary the use of the atomic bombs. The bombings were integral to a strategy that was oblivious to all of the possibilities that a peace might have been negotiated that would have checked Japanese militarism while blocking Communist advance.

Needless to say, neither Hoover's nor any similar advice was followed. An invasion was planned, the bombs were dropped, and the Soviet Union came into the war to take its strategic place in Asia as promised at Yalta. It required a short four years for China to fall to Mao, less than an additional year for the North Koreans to invade South Korea, and less than ten years for Communism under Ho Chi Minh to launch its all-out attack on

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[48] Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, pp. 86-88.

[49] See footnote #5.

[50] Grew, *Turbulent Era*, p. 1446.

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the French in Indochina. The role of the Truman administration in China during the years 1945 to 1949 is well known. Welles recounts how General George C. Marshall, as representative of the administration, threatened Chiang Kai-shek "that all American assistance would be withdrawn unless he 'broadened' his government by appointing Communists."[51] Within the world Left, and especially within the United States, an intensive propaganda campaign was waged to demonize Chiang Kai-shek, who not long before had been seen as both a great man and a progressive leader.[52] Owen Lattimore, about whom Robert Newman has written a supportive biography and whose East Asian policies he reflects in his defense of Hiroshima, was central to this. In his book *Reminiscences*, General Douglas MacArthur describes the disastrous course of the Truman administration's policy toward Chiang and Mao:

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[51] Welles, *Seven Decisions*, p. 217. On June 14, 1951, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy made a lengthy speech in the United States Senate that reviewed the history of General Marshall's role in the geo-political issues, both in Europe and in Asia, that are the subject of the final part of the present monograph. This speech was later published as *America's Retreat from Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall* (New York: Devin Adair Company, 1962). Readers should notice the varieties of interpretation of the events we have been tracing. Baldwin considered the failures a product of naivete; I treat them as partly the result of naivete, but also of profound ideological skewing; Senator McCarthy looked for consciously committed assistance to the Communist cause. In McCarthy's day, and especially since, the conventional wisdom has been to decry McCarthy's view as abusive and extreme. But it was precisely McCarthy's merit that he was by far the most articulate voice urging Americans to see the struggle against Communist totalitarianism in the same moral terms in which they had seen that against Nazism. At a time when 600,000,000 additional people had fallen under Communist domination in eastern Europe and China during just the preceding five years, he had reason to wish to assign responsibility. There is no particular virtue in the refusal of others to do so. No doubt there *were* people who were responsible for the disastrous policies that were adopted.

[52] See Murphey, *Liberalism*, pp. 256-57, 265-66. As late as August 1943 a *New Republic* editorial praised Chiang: "The meliorism of Thorstein Veblen and J. A. Hobson he finds in harmony with the best present tendencies in Chinese thought." The blackening of his image began within just a few months after this editorial appeared and rose to a crescendo during the war between Chiang and Mao in the late 1940s.

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> In China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was gradually pushing the Communists back, being largely aided and supplied by the United States. For some unaccountable reason, the Communists were not looked upon with disfavor by the State Department, who labeled them 'agrarian reformers.' Instead of pushing on to the victory that was within the Generalissimo's grasp, an armistice was arranged, and General Marshall was sent to amalgamate the two opponents... After months of fruitless negotiation, he withdrew without tangible results, and the war for China resumed. But in this interval of seven months a decisive change had taken place. The Generalissimo had received no munitions or supplies from the United States, but the Soviets, working day and night, reinforced the Chinese Communist armies. The great mass of military supplies we had sent them at Vladivostok during the later stages of the war, none of which had been used, was largely transferred to the Chinese forces, so that when hostilities were resumed, the balance of power had shifted. They pressed their advantage to the fullest, and finally drove the Generalissimo's forces out of continental Asia onto Formosa. The decision to withhold previously pledged American support was one of the greatest mistakes every made in our history.[53]

It has become commonplace for members of the American Left, such as Robert Newman in his *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China*, to scoff at the notion that all of this had anything to do with Mao's victory. But the scoffing must be understood as ideological pleading.

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[53] General Douglas MacArthur, *Reminicences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 320.

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The Problem of Equality

Kevin Lamb

> Quality is better than equality. Institutions and customs which seek equality for equality's sake are useless, and likely to be pernicious.
> **Edward Lee Thorndike**[1]

In a 40th anniversary retrospective of **Brown vs Board of Education**, *USA Today* noted how the late Supreme Court justice Thurgood Marshall resented society's reluctance to embrace integration.

> "We are not yet all equals," Marshall wrote in a 1978 memo to his fellow justices. "As to this country being a melting pot – either the Negro did not get in the pot or he did not get melted down ... The disparity between the races is increasing."[2]

Typical of the post **Brown** era, Marshall's view reflects modern egalitarian assumptions about racial inequality – namely that most civil members of society are responsible for this dilemma. With a growing middle class enclave of predominantly white suburbs and an urban underclass of ethnic minorities, many continue to believe as Jack Kemp does that the right mix of economic, social and political reforms can reverse this racial fragmentation of society. The premises behind these legal and social reforms, which were intended to reverse racial inequality, are rarely if ever challenged. Can social engineering bring about universal human equality?

Although racial inequality is often viewed as a "societal" condition, social critics have failed to explain *how* "society" actually causes this inequality. Few if any distinctions are ever made between equality before the law (equal rights) and a natural condition of

[1]Thorndike, Edward Lee *Human Nature and the Social Order* The Macmillan Co., 1940., p. 962.

[2]Mauro, Tony "Brown' Ruling 'Broke Back of American Apartheid" *USA Today*, May 12, 1994., p.2a.

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human equality (egalitarianism). As social policy advocates, egalitarians have been effective in making any distinction between equality of rights and innate human equality ambiguous. This ambiguity is primarily a modern phenomenon since progressive and conservative scholars in the past understood the distinction between political and biological equality. Now, confusion prevails not only because of the widespread acceptance and unchallenged assumptions of egalitarianism, but also because the case for human biological equality remains inconclusive.

In the wake of **Brown**, American legal and social policy: outlawed segregation, enacted a host of civil and voting rights laws, adopted equal opportunity measures in both the public and private sectors (including a ban on the use of IQ tests for hiring and promotions), implemented affirmative action measures in education and the workplace, introduced quotas and set asides that award federal contracts to "disadvantaged" minority firms, and established a range of anti-poverty programs – from medicaid and WIC to headstart and the earned income tax credit – in order to reshape society into an egalitarian landscape free of racial inequality.

If forty years of desegregation and social engineering have failed to produce egalitarian results, then the assumptions of modern social reformers become suspect. As long as the concept of *equality* remains ambiguous, social welfare policies that are intended to reduce human *inequality* will remain dubious as well. Unlike the colorblind goals of civil rights activists that embraced equal opportunity, the contemporary agenda of fanatical egalitarians like Jonathan Kozol is nothing less than the total elimination of income disparities and group differences. However, a society with group-based hierarchies isn't necessarily intolerant or repressive. Is it reasonable to believe that the lack of opportunity is all that prevents an egalitarian leveling of group distinctions or could other factors unrelated to discrimination also contribute to human inequality?

Social critics who often consider inequality in terms of "social" or "distributive" justice refuse to clarify what "racial equality" fully entails. Is this inequality measured in terms of tangible or non-tangible results? For instance, the success or failure of equal opportunity is often evaluated against social policies that are intended to produce equal outcomes. Measuring the attainment of equal opportunity by the yardstick of equal results is a fallacy. The idea

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that inequality is strictly a matter of discrimination rests upon faulty premises, namely that unequal results constitute prima facie evidence of unequal opportunity. Identically similar opportunities may simply yield different outcomes. The reason is that differences in temperament, personality traits, motivation, perseverance and other personal factors often distinguish those who seize opportunities from those who squander them.

Such notions raise fundamental questions about biology and human equality that receive little if any consideration in the popular press: What are the causes of behavioral differences among ethnic groups? Are there biologically-based differences in personality traits, temperament, attitude and character and how do they affect social trends? Is universal human equality attainable? What are the societal implications of group differences? Is racial inequality a 'natural condition?' Can the goals and objectives of a color-blind society be reached if racial differences persevere? Have desegregation measures run their course? Is "society" really accountable for racial inequality? Are whites in American, East Indians in Guiana or in East Africa, responsible for a racially "polarized" society? Does the current state of race relations simply reflect a "misunderstanding" that only lacks "dialogue?" Are social and anti-social behavioral traits uniformly distributed among individuals? Do race differences necessarily lead to rigid racial hierarchies?

Some scholars like Lani Guinier, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, advocate a "national conversation about race and fundamental fairness." Such a "conversation" should include a wide spectrum of views, most notably leading authorities in differential psychology, behavioral genetics and sociobiology who are usually excluded (in some cases disinvited) from such public forums. Likewise, racially taboo issues should feature prominently in any national commission on race relations. Tenable views should not be prohibited simply because of their controversial nature. Instead of disregarding the sources of human inequality, as the National Academy of Sciences did a generation ago, commonly held assumptions about race differences and human equality deserve further scrutiny – assumptions that are now being contested by an

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influential cadre of behavioral scientists.[3]

Egalitarianism as Ideology

Universal human equality, the idea that humans are biologically similar and that genetic differences can not explain variations of human behavior, continues to influence how people perceive social problems. It often determines our "accepted" perceptions of others. From academic achievement to crime, it shapes the direction and scope of scholarly research as few ideas do. It remains the ideological cornerstone of contemporary social anthropology, and the scope of its impact extends into current behavioral science controversies. Even campus life can not escape the perils of egalitarianism since it fuels the 'Political Correctness' phenomenon on many college campuses. In essence, the idea of human equality remains one of the most influential forces in not only modern academe but the whole of American society.

As an empirical truth that adequately explains human behavioral differences, egalitarianism best exemplifies a social ideology rather than a valid scientific theory. Egalitarians have been instrumental in explaining race differences in terms of "discrimination," "racism" and "oppression," but the issue is really over the validity of egalitarianism and whether it rests upon questionable assumptions about human nature. Over the years, egalitarians have routinely disregarded a growing amount of empirical evidence that corroborate individual and group behavioral differences unless, as in the case with *The Bell Curve*, they are forced to confront the obvious implications of these findings. Instead of providing evidence to the contrary, the typical response is nothing more than a barrage of ad hominem attacks.

The empirical nature of modern egalitarianism resembles what British political scientist Kenneth Minogue refers to as a 'pure theory' of ideology. In his 1985 study *Alien Powers*, Minogue strips away the facade of ideological reasoning by untangling its circular logic and groundless rhetoric. Basically, ideologies try to reveal "oppressive structures" that "dominate" society; a "system" that is otherwise impervious to change. Despite advancements in contemporary society (economic, legal, social and technological progress), ideologues simply

[3]*Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA* Vol. 69, No. 1, January 1972., pp. 1-3.

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dismiss trends that would thwart the need for drastic social engineering. Public attitudes toward race is a good illustration. Although reliable polling data consistently show sizeable shifts in the racial views of most Americans, critics still maintain that in terms of social implications, the severity and magnitude of "racism" remains unaltered.[4] Like a translucent chameleon, the spectre of racism never subsides, it simply takes on a new form.

The irony of free and prosperous societies is that any progressive social change is really a mirage imposed by political and social structures hell-bent on domination and oppression. The objective then becomes a game of hunt the "structure." As Minogue puts it,

> Ideology is a philosophical type of allegiance purporting to transcend the mere particularities of family, religion or native hearth, and its essence lies in *struggle*. The world is a battlefield, in which there are two enemies. One is the oppressor, the other consists of fellow ideologists who have generally mistaken the conditions of liberation ... *Structure* determines whatever we experience ... the most remarkable thing about ideology is the attempt to generate liberation out of a pure theory of social change.[5]

Minogue's 'pure theory' of ideology casts some much needed light on the mind-set of contemporary egalitarians. It illuminates the twisted logic of these latter-day levellers. From a scientific standpoint, egalitarianism insulates itself from empirical corroboration. The issue of falsifiability distinguishes egalitarianism from legitimate scientific theories. As Karl Popper once demonstrated, a theory is scientifically valid so long as it can be falsified. Theories that are incapable of being falsified, for whatever

[4]Sniderman, Paul M. and Thomas Piazza *The Scar of Race* Harvard University Press, 1993., pp. 166-178.

[5]Minogue, Kenneth *Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology* St. Martin's Press, 1985., p. 4.

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else they may be, are scientifically unsound.[6] It is this criteria that distinguishes the scientific validity of innate individual and group differences (human inequality) over the ideological pretenses of universal human equality (egalitarianism). Social ideologies like egalitarianism fail to meet this credibility requirement. Rather, as Minogue points out, social ideology is "like sand at a picnic, it gets in everything." At its core, egalitarianism is a *belief* that rests upon dubious presumptions. Consider the views of Nicholas Lemann, national correspondent for the *Atlantic* monthly, and William Raspberry, columnist for *The Washington Post*.

In "The Structure Of Success In America," the first of a two-part series in the *Atlantic*, Lemann points out that "in America perhaps only race is a more sensitive subject than the way we sort ourselves out in the *struggle* for success." According to Lemann, psychometricians ("true believers who thought they had found a way to measure the one essential human ability") devised IQ and aptitude tests in order to further the interests of society's ruling elite. As he puts it, "The overall results of intelligence tests have always produced a kind of photograph of the existing *class structure*, in which the better-off economic and ethnic groups are found to be more intelligent and the worse-off are found to be less so."[7]

Lemann seems more interested in justifying the ideological trappings of egalitarianism than establishing the truth about the pioneers of mental testing. His depiction of Spearman's two-factor theory and Thurstone's own work in psychometrics is misleading if not outright inaccurate. By claiming that Spearman and others "backed away from their 'g' enthusiasm," Lemann constructs a false dichotomy that attempts to undermine Spearman's theory and to discredit the concept of general intelligence. One only has to compare Lemann's version with thorough and more objective historical accounts, such as John B. Carroll's *Human Cognitive*

[6]Popper, Karl R. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Basic Books, Inc., 1959., and *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.

[7]Lemann, Nicholas "The Structure of Success in America" and "The Great Sorting" *The Atlantic Monthly* August and September 1995., p. 41 and p. 84.

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Abilities or in *Measuring the Mind* by Adrian Wooldridge.[8]

In meticulous detail, Carroll explains the historical development of cognitive ability research. He draws attention to a claim so often – and erroneously – made, and one that Lemann reiterates, namely that Thurstone's multi-factorial method refuted Spearman's 'g' (general intelligence theory). Actually, Spearman's two-factor theory recognized special abilities while Thurstone acknowledged the plausibility of 'g'. Carroll notes, "From today's standpoint, it is unfortunate that this debate ever took place. It caused, and has continued to cause, much distrust of factorial methods, particularly among those who have not bothered to understand the nub of the controversy."[9]

Wooldridge shows how the pioneers of mental testing were essentially progressive in outlook and, contrary to Lemann's argument, committed to a meritocratic ideal out of a sense of fairness for those who had the ability to excel but faced restricted opportunities from class-based discrimination. As Wooldridge points out,

> [The] psychologists who dominated educational thinking for much of this century were meritocrats rather than conservatives and progressives rather than traditionalists. They combined a passion for measurement with a commitment to child-centered education. Their work was inspired by a desire to open admission to established institutions to able children, regardless of their social origins, and to base education on the natural process of child development. They found their most articulate supporters on the left and their most stubborn opponents on the right. In theory, their arguments were subversive of the social hierarchy; and in practice they provided important opportunities for able working-class children to rise into the

[8]Carroll, John B. *Human Cognitive Abilities: A Survey of Factor-Analytic Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 1993., pp. 37-45. See also, Adrian Wooldridge *Measuring the Mind: Education and Psychology in England, c. 1860-1990*, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[9]Carroll, pp. 44-45.

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elite.[10]

By arguing that these pioneers preferred a rigid aristocratic hierarchy of society's ruling elite, Lemann simply repeats the egalitarian canard that aptitude and IQ testing inaccurately measures mental ability while discriminating on the basis of class and race.

Lemann's extreme egalitarian convictions surface in his defense of affirmative action. In defending racial preferences, Lemann argues in *The New York Times Magazine* that "one criterion, educational performance, is over-weighted and has become too much the sole path to good jobs and leadership positions."[11] The fallacy in Lemann's reasoning – that barriers to opportunity alone prohibit a greater multi-ethnic diversity among corporate conglomerates – is the denial of real human differences. By refusing to acknowledge individual and ethnic differences, elaborate schemes of structural oppression and domination (however contrived) offer the only other possible explanation for this lack of proportional diversity. Instead of ignoring human differences, Lemann and other egalitarians must explain *why* these differences are irrelevant to the issue of inequality. Perhaps civil society would benefit by disregarding ability levels and educational achievement, but Lemann has yet to make such a case.

The familiar refrain of this ideological rhetoric turns up in a recent Raspberry column on race relations. In defending what many would rightfully consider to be a double standard, Raspberry argues that the leaders of a Black Student Union have the right to exclude Whites as officers in order to "preserve the integrity" of the BSU. White law officers with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, on the other hand, have no moral justification for forming their own association. As Raspberry puts it, "The easy answer goes to purpose. Black or female or Asian subgroups are formed to help their members deal with *white-male-dominated* organizations. A distinct White male subgroup could only have as its purpose to maintain its *domination*." He goes on to claim that Whites may feel justified in forming "a White Student Association at Howard University," but simply because "they may be in the minority ... they are not *oppressed*

[10]Wooldridge, pp. 16-17.

[11]Lemann, Nicholas "Taking Affirmative Action Apart" *The New York Times Magazine*, June 11, 1995., p. 62.

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minorities."[12]

Egalitarians vs Differentialists

Two broad groups of scholars reflect a growing trend in not only academic circles but in the rest of American society as well: an ever widening gulf between social scientists (egalitarians) who adhere to the idea of innate human equality and behavioral scientists (differentialists) who emphasize individual and group differences in demeanor. Egalitarian social critics, like Cornell West, Andrew Hacker, Kozol and Lemann, continually blame civil society for racial inequality. Racial disparities in educational achievement, personal income, crime, capital punishment, sentencing, incidents of AIDS, lending practices and occupational status will persist, so they claim, as long as the attitudes of middle-class suburban Whites endure.

These social critics routinely denounce plausible alternatives to the dogma of egalitarianism. Any rational consideration of race differences rarely enters into any analysis of human disparities or group comparisons. This again is partly attributed to persistent confusion over the meaning of "racial equality." Historically, modern egalitarians depart from liberals who recognized legal and political equality but rejected the biological uniformity of man. A number of progressive scholars, like Havelock Ellis, Charles Horton Cooley, Herman J. Muller, Frank Hankins and J.B.S. Haldane accepted the idea of racial differences while they rejected the superiority doctrines of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard. Even the renowned British socialist R. H. Tawney once argued that, "you cannot put an edge on a leaden knife, and that education is relatively unimportant in its effect on the life of the individual and the character of the society because it works within the foundations set by innate qualities."[13]

Another school of thought primarily in the behavioral sciences maintains that human behavior neither exists in a vacuum nor is determined by sheer circumstance. It recognizes that human conduct is conditioned by biological and social factors; the unique interaction of nature and nurture that produces individual and group differences

[12]Raspberry, William "Dubiously Exclusive" *The Washington Post*, November 24, 1995., p. A29.

[13]Wooldridge, p. 206.

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in behavior. Although social scientists often reassure us that the nurturing influence of the environment determines both social and anti-social conduct, a steady flow of behavioral science research also attributes some of the variance to genetic, neurological and bio-chemical influences. Environmental factors alone are incapable of explaining persistent differences in behavior.

In this regard, the latest discovery by a team of Johns Hopkins researchers is particularly instructive. The findings show how different strains of mice produce different levels of aggression. Since the mice shared the same caged surroundings, the differences can not be attributed to their environment; rather the aggressive behavior was directly related to genetic differences. The genetically-altered more aggressive mice lacked normal levels of nitric oxide, a chemical deficiency that influences malevolent behavior. The broader implication, beside the limited influence of the environment, is that the genetic differences involved a simple compound regulated by an enzyme. In other words, the differences were not enormous but minuscule. While skeptics will point out that mice, though similar in neurological structure, are not identical to humans, a plausible inference can be made in which slight genetic differences that influence aggressive behavior may in fact operate in species that are equivalent neurologically.[14]

Roger J. Williams, the eminent bio-chemist and former president of the American Chemical Society, once summarized the differentialist view this way,

> In biology and in medicine, as well as in the areas of social sciences and philosophy, we have concentrated too much on "a single recognizable picture of man" and have given too little attention to *men*, the individuals who make up the species, the persons who become patients, and the units who make up society. Of course, we can draw a single recognizable picture of man. He will have a skeleton, muscles, organs, nervous system, hungers, emotions, aspirations, etc., but as long as we hope to solve or understand human problems on the basis of such a generalized being, our operations must be at a very elementary level and many

[14]Nelson, Randy J., et. al. "Behavioural Abnormalities in male mice lacking neuronal hormonal nitric oxide synthase," *Nature*, Vol. 378, November 23, 1995, pp. 383-386.

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problems will completely elude us.[15]

The vast majority of middle class suburbanites are well aware of recent events that occur with predictable regularity, namely the sociopathic character of urban culture. Whether its the bedlam that follows racially charged criminal trials or the fear of confronting a motorist in the wake of an accident, knowing that your next move may be your last, such events subsequently affect the decisions of those who seek out safe and stable communities for their families, especially for the social well-being of children. Common sense dictates that when a third of young black males are either in prison, on parole or under correctional supervision, there is something more that influences urban social pathologies than simply disparities in criminal sentencing, illegal drugs, or inadequate public housing.

What Marshall and other egalitarians fail to comprehend is that when matters of community safety and public concern collide with race, most people's intuitions are reliably more sound than unsubstantiated assumptions of egalitarian social reformers. The burden of proof that race differences are inconsequential on issues of human inequality rests with those who claim otherwise. In other words, differences matter.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Is It Time for
a Second Constitutional Convention?
By Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey; Roger Clegg, Editor
The National Legal Center for the Public Interest,
Washington, D. C. 1995. 211 pages.

In 1987 the United States celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the U.S. Constitution – the oldest written constitution of any nation in the world. The celebration highlighted the durability of the U.S. Constitution and its contribution to the American nation. Yet this provocative book, comprising a series of lectures by the distinguished Judge Malcolm R. Wilkey, argues that despite its past successes all is not well with the American Constitution, and that it is now time to call for a Second Constitutional Convention to correct the defects that time has revealed in the earlier Constitution.

The contents of this volume provide the thoughtful reader with much solid material on which to ponder. Author Wilkey argues eloquently for a Second Constitutional Convention. However, in order to engage the debate properly, vigorous arguments against such a constitutional convention are offered in the form of discussion and commentary by a variety of political and academic leaders. These offer the serious academic, the political leader, and the casual observer of politics much to consider in examining this critical question.

Judge Wilkey draws our attention to a fundamental issue which he believes Americans must consider: do we, as Americans, want to be governed by a professional political class or should we be governed by the part-time citizen legislator (or the historical Cincinnatus model)? Peering into the heart of the American system, Judge Wilkey notes that the American system of government has become a disappointment and that fundamental change is unlikely because of the vested interest in the status quo of the American political leadership. The proper road to reform is

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remaking the system through a Second Constitutional Convention.

Even the election results in 1994 – the capture of both houses of Congress by the Republicans for the first time in forty years – has not changed the basic issues raised by Judge Wilkey in these lectures, delivered primarily in the fall of 1993 at Brigham Young University. Despite the political upheaval, certain reforms have not been accomplished. The editor, Vice President and General Counsel of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest (and former U. S. Department of Justice official in 1982-1993) Roger Clegg, puts the argument in these succinct terms:

> Judge Wilkey's lectures identified three fundamental, government-limiting reforms that also happened to become part of the Republican "Contract with America." None now appears likely to be approved as a constitutional amendment by Congress. First the balanced-budget amendment passed the House but died in the Senate. Then term limits failed even to come close to the needed two-thirds' majority in the House. And the third, the line-item veto, has not even been proposed as an amendment. Instead, it has been proposed only as a statute – a considerably less powerful (and permanent) reform. (p. 2)

The fact that these reforms seem unlikely of accomplishment – that they have done well in the House but faltered in the Senate – gives currency to the suggestion of Judge Wilkey.

The reader can follow the case for the proposed reform through Judge Wilkey's able discussion of the issue. He ties his views carefully to those of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and calls upon their authority, as he believes they would join him in calling for a new constitutional convention. He opts clearly for the limited government envisioned by the Founding Fathers (in contrast to the effectual government model of the professional political class). The evils that have developed include total unaccountability, judicial activism, perpetual incumbency and gridlock. The solution is a second constitutional convention which would recapture the first principles of the original Constitution.

Judge Wilkey provides not only an excellent analysis of the

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present problems facing our country but a good historical and political analysis of the intentions of the American Founding Fathers and the origins of the U.S. Constitution. It is an analysis of the Constitution that too few students receive in their schooling, and the current generation of U.S. students could benefit from a reading of this section alone. The examination of this early period is essential for Judge Wilkey's critique of our present system and his proposed solution by way of a Second Constitutional Convention.

Three critical premises were held by the Founding Fathers which led them to structure the Constitution as they did. The result was a product of their experiences – the weak Articles of Confederation with no executive power, the "tyranny" experiences including both that of King George III and their own state legislatures, and the fear that a national legislature would use patronage for corrupt purposes. In the words of Judge Wilkey:

> ...the object was to make the executive both powerful and pure, and the device employed was a separation of powers, which provided checks on the legislature not only by the executive but also by an independent judiciary. (p. 12)

He notes that they succeeded so well in remedying the earlier problem that a real problem now exists in that history has come full circle and "the ineffectiveness of our present system now matches the undisputed ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation." (pp. 12-13)

According to Judge Wilkey, the framers of the Constitution were inspired by a real sense of a limited role of government. They envisaged a president who would be a representative of the whole country and its united interests. Political parties did not exist, so they did not conceive of him as a party leader. Also, they saw the members of the legislative bodies as community leaders who would return to their respective professions as soon as each legislative session finished. In these circumstances the political system would operate efficiently, with separation of powers being the key to an effective functioning of government.

However, something went wrong. Technology has made the

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difference:

> The impact of television alone invalidates every assumption of the Framers as to the role of the national legislature and the character and selection of its members. In sum, the Framers' original idea was that the central government would be handled by men whose governmental duties were part-time. What we are now living in, and trying to make work, is a system designed for talented and capable part-time amateurs but filled with perpetual professional politicians – and without the responsibility provided by a parliamentary system which automatically generates a visible accountable majority. (p.14)

The Framers, Judge Wilkey notes, wrestled with the same questions we face today: by whom and what institutions should decisions be made? Though the objectives remain the same, (e.g., to provide a representative government of, for and by the people), "... the Framers have been overwhelmed by technology. Our Constitution was drafted by candlelight" (p. 15). His call is to use the same wisdom that the Framers did in confronting our problems today.

One observation should be added. Judge Wilkey is critical of the amendments added over that two hundred years, since almost no structural change was brought about. He attributes this result to the basic problem he sees with the present government: those who would be most affected by change (e.g., those who would have powers altered) are those who have the power to initiate amendments (e.g., Members of Congress) – and are the most hesitant to do so.

He examines the three problems mentioned earlier in this review – gridlock, perpetual incumbency and total unaccountability – in detail. His analytical powers and scholarship are reflected in his review of these problems. He sees a paralysis of action caused by the incumbents' perceived need for reelection, which breeds the need for money. The number of appointments which the Senate must confirm, the size of the House (e.g., districts are too small), as well as interbranch and interparty conflict, add to the continuing problems. He notes that gridlock in Congress has had the

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undesirable result of encouraging extralegal action (in secret and outside the law) by the executive branch. Perpetual incumbency feeds the growth of the size of government as political power is used to promote reelection. And he cites the budget deficit as the greatest manifestation of total unaccountability.

The book would be worthwhile just for its discussion of judicial activism. The author defines the problem succinctly: "That judicial activism is produced by the systematic failure to function of the legislative and executive branches seems to have gone unrecognized, yet all the evidence of direct causation is there. After neither Congress nor the state legislatures have (sic) taken any action on a long-festering problem with arguable constitutional overtones, nowadays that problem inevitably works its way into federal courts" (p. 39). He admits that his growing awareness of judicial activism initiated his interest in constitutional reform, and provides examples of judicial activism (e.g., the *Baker* v. *Carr* decision on legislative reapportionment) and the consequences (e.g., legislative abdication of the authority to deal with pressing political issues). He quotes the wise words of Theodore Roosevelt who warned that "the right way to get rid of a bad law is to have the legislature repeal it, and not to have the courts by ingenious hair-splitting nullify it." A government of the people will lose its safeguard if it is allowed a "means to defeat their will by the technicalities of strained construction" (p. 43).

The heart of the discussion is the section on "Needed Reforms." The particular changes he discusses include term limits, a longer term for House Members (e.g., six years), an increase in the size of House districts, a broadening of presidential powers, budgetary reforms (e.g., enactment of the line-item veto), a six year term for the President, and a reduction of the number of officials who must be confirmed by the Senate. These proposals are not without controversy, but Judge Wilkey makes a convincing case for them.

The critics engage Judge Wilkey in intellectual debate. Walter Berns warns that any Constitutional Convention would in all probability be dominated by demagogues, while Phyllis Schlafly fears that it would be impossible to limit a Constitutional Convention to a certain agenda and that the outcome might be more

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harmful than beneficial. Ed. Meese wants a restoration of limited government but does not see the problem being corrected by a Constitutional Convention. Other distinguished personalities give their views and Judge Wilkey responds with an informed commentary on each.

Whether or not readers agree with Judge Wilkey's call for a second Constitutional Convention, they will readily agree that he has highlighted the weaknesses that are hamstringing attempts to reform American government. He has performed a magnificent service by drawing attention to the problems inherent in the current American system of government, by stressing the need for systemic reform and by arguing the case so eloquently. Whatever direction the move toward constitutional reform may take, the debate will have been enriched by his contribution.

Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law
by David J. Armor
Oxford University Press, 1995

One of the most blatant abuses of political power in Western democracies is the imposition of social reform by judicial fiat. In the United States, the role of the federal judiciary in implementing and enforcing 'civil rights' laws illustrates the excessive reach of federal authority. One recent study considers the pernicious effects of judicial activism on American society.

In *Forced Justice*, David Armor examines in meticulous detail the effectiveness of court-ordered desegregation measures and its impact on public education. Armor, a former researcher with the Rand Corporation and now sociologist at George Mason University, probes the underlying rationale and subsequent record of forced integration.

A series of legal rulings that followed the landmark *Brown v Board of Education* decision of 1954 paved the way for federal mandates that forced public school districts to desegregate. The *Brown* decision overturned the 'separate but equal' doctrine of the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in *Plessy v Ferguson*, which found that

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state-imposed segregation violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In essence, the *Brown* decision found that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."

Armor questions the basis on which the *Brown* decision rests, namely the psychological findings from Kenneth Clark and other social scientists that found segregated classrooms caused low self-esteem among black students. This low self-esteem was brought out by doll studies of Kenneth and Mamie Clark, which alleged that black students' preferences for white dolls demonstrated their low self-esteem.

An interesting side note is how the media often portray psychological research when it coincides with the aims of social reformers. Journalists regularly challenge the scientific legitimacy of IQ tests, usually by claiming that 'IQ' is an outdated and undefined psychological concept even though it remains one of the most analyzed and academically accepted concepts in modern psychology. By contrast, journalists have uncritically accepted flawed psychological studies such as Clark's without questioning their validity. Armor notes that,

> Interestingly, one of the Clarks' earliest findings raised a question about whether segregation was one of the mechanism that caused this psychological harm. Although all black children had substantial rates of incorrect racial identification, those in the segregated South were more likely to make correct self-identifications than those in northern desegregated environments. This finding did not receive much attention at the time, and it was ignored in the earliest versions of the harm and benefit thesis.

As Armor points out, the rationale behind social desegregation measures, the 'harm and benefit' doctrine, was based upon questionable interpretations of racial identification and low self-esteem among black school children. By stipulating that segregated schools remained harmful to the psychological well-being of black students, this rationale implied that racially balanced classrooms would not only raise self-esteem levels but eventually produce equal outcomes in educational performance. This is one

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of several unrealistic expectations that social reformers thought desegregation would overcome. Their premises were significantly flawed.

In the past two decades, the goals and aspirations behind fully integrating the nation's public schools have come up short in producing the intended results. Despite racially balanced classrooms and increased spending for urban school districts, gaps remain in the educational achievement levels of black and white students, and the efforts to comply with the courts have in many cases resulted in white flight and re-segregated nearby residential areas. David Armor's study is an essential contribution to understanding the misguided efforts of social engineering by judicial decree. *(Kevin Lamb)*

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